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ABSTRACT 
 
 Since 2014, the security environment around the Baltic Sea has gone through an 
increase of instability and has gained higher military-strategic importance. After 
Russia’s aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine and the following international tensions, 
the Baltic, but also the Nordic countries have become extensively exposed to a military 
threat from the East. In managing common threats, cooperative security efforts are of 
uttermost importance for such a small area. The thesis analyses the Nordic-Baltic 
countries’ perceptions of collective security within the framework of regional security 
complex theory, looking at the states’ strategic relation to NATO and at their interests 
of cooperation within the Nordic-Baltic area in the changed security environment. The 
research is conducted by qualitative content analysis and is based on strategic 
documentation. Through this, contributions are made to literature and theory as well as 
to research on the Nordic-Baltic area and mapping the policy interests of Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden. The thesis argues that recent 
developments in the security situation have motivated the Nordic-Baltic countries to 
come closer in regional security cooperation, and that all countries of the area are 
strategically remarkably similar to NATO, regardless of whether they are member or 
partner states of the Alliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The international security environment has undergone remarkable changes 
following Russian annexation of Crimea in spring 2014. Due to Russian actions’ 
incompatibility with international law and unacceptability in the Euro-Atlantic value 
space, relations between the Western countries and Russia have weakened. International 
sanctions have been imposed, cooperation between the two sides has been largely 
brought to halt, and unpredictability and instability in Europe have risen to a level that 
has not been seen since the end of Cold War. While during the post-Cold War period, 
the Western security focus has in general been shifting more and more towards conflict 
management activities outside its own borders, the events of Ukraine have brought 
geopolitical concerns back to Europe. Albeit Russian growing military strength and 
fearless violation of international norms are distressing the Western society as a whole, 
the concerns about Russia’s aggressive behaviour are more considerable in its close 
vicinity. Therefore, the Baltic Sea region is greatly influenced by such developments. 
Russia’s behaviour has fractured security and stability in the region, raised the military-
strategic importance of the area and given the countries in the region a reason to 
reconsider aspects of their foreign policy and security and defence behaviour. Because 
of their Soviet history and location on the Eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic 
community, the three Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are the most 
exposed to the new security reality. Two Nordic countries, Finland and Norway, also 
share a border with Russia, thereat Finland a particularly long one. Due to multifarious 
and extensive integration of the Nordic countries and their location by the Baltic Sea, 
also Sweden and Denmark would be affected by any incidents in the area. The fifth 
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Nordic nation, Iceland, is less influenced by the new security circumstances due to its 
geographical remoteness. 
Considering the security and defence of the Nordic-Baltic area, effective 
cooperation between the countries is of critical importance in terms of dealing with both 
common security interests and aims as well as with problems and threats. Nordic-Baltic 
security cooperation dates back nearly three decades. During and immediately after the 
restoration of the Baltic States’ independence in 1991, security and defence cooperation 
between the Baltic and Nordic countries was rather close and Nordic countries had a 
significant role in assisting and supporting the process of building up the Baltics’ 
defence capabilities (Archer, 1999). Despite the prosperous start, the countries’ 
individual choices in international relations have been somewhat heterogeneous and 
there is still no unifying structure which would bring all the Baltic and Nordic countries 
together in the security field.  
 Currently, the security and defence policy around the Baltic Sea is developed 
and shaped within different organisations and frameworks. The most crucial role in 
ensuring the region’s security is carried out by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation). Denmark and Norway were amongst the twelve founding members of 
NATO in 1949, the three Baltic countries joined the alliance no less than 55 years later 
– in 2004. Sweden and Finland identify themselves as militarily non-aligned countries, 
and are thus not members of NATO. However, both are considered to be close partners 
of the alliance as they have been participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme since 1994 and are also NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Program (EOP) 
partners with tailor-made cooperation programmes since 2014. The five Nordic 
countries have created a common defence framework of their own, NORDEFCO 
(Nordic Defence Cooperation, formed in 2009), which does not include the Baltic 
States. The tripartite cooperation of the Baltic States (known as 3B), through which the 
three countries have been performing joint defence projects since restoring their 
independence in the end of Cold War, in turn, leaves aside the Nordic countries. The 
European Union (EU), which most of the countries of the region are members of, has 
adopted a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and aims to elevate its efforts 
in the security and defence field. In November 2017, also a new joint security and 
defence framework, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was signed 
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between Member States of the European Union. Yet, similarly as with the EU’s CSDP, 
Denmark has abstained from joining the framework, and Norway does not take part in 
the framework either as it is not a member of the European Union. However, due to it 
being so recent, the PESCO framework will not be further considered in the thesis, as it 
has not been in place long enough to have become a remarkable security player in the 
region. The only institution that includes all of the states in the region, hence also all of 
the Nordic-Baltic countries, is the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and although it 
coordinates the member states’ work on collaborative projects in the region, its security 
and defence actions have remained limited to certain aspects of societal security at 
most. There have also been some joint initiatives and political dialogue under the 
Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) cooperation format, however practical cooperation, 
particularly in security area has remained rather modest. Thus far, besides bilateral 
projects, for the Nordic and Baltic countries the main frameworks for working towards 
their security and defence aims have hence been NATO, NORDEFCO and 3B. 
Side by side with the joint cooperation, each country has its own idea and 
consciousness about the security environment, its threats and developments, as well as 
strategic arrangements, cooperative relations, and policy and action plans on how to 
keep their populations, territories and independence secure in terms of the current 
security landscape. These perceptions are most comprehensively represented in national 
strategic documentation. Such information also reflects on how the states identify 
themselves within the global and regional security environment and how they grasp 
security as a shared value and concept through their policy choices – which countries 
and international structures they consider to be their main partners, with whom they 
share their values, principles, aims and policy objectives, with whom they wish and plan 
to carry out practical cooperation, etc. The security landscape has a direct influence on 
such perceptions. Therefore, evident shifts in the international environment, both of 
global and regional type, also have the power to make countries reconsider their 
strategic positions and reshape them accordingly. For the countries of Baltic Sea region, 
growing unpredictability and aggressive unlawful behaviour of Russia in Ukraine since 
2014 has been a serious change of more or less balanced situation and neighbourly 
developments beforehand. 
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In academic literature, the question of security in the Baltic Sea region and 
Nordic-Baltic area is certainly not a new topic. For evident historical reasons, most of it 
is rather recent and dates back less than three decades. However, due to fast changes in 
the area’s security environment, the literature can be considered quite multifaceted. It is 
possible to distinguish between several more specific research aspects, whereas the 
share dealing with the Nordic-Baltic region as an entity on its own makes up a minority 
of the discussion. More often the research has been limited to security concerns of 
single states or smaller groups of states such as Baltic countries, Nordic countries, 
militarily non-aligned countries. 
Academic research about the Baltic States’ security could be divided into two: 
studies from the period before and the ones after the countries’ accession to NATO in 
2004. The earlier research has analysed security concepts, defence postures and main 
threats and risks in the three states during their first decade of re-established 
independence (Kundu, 2003; Trapans, 1998), but has been to a greater extent committed 
to examining the Baltics’ possible future in NATO. Numerous articles about NATO 
enlargement to the three Baltics have been questioning the probability of the Baltic 
countries’ accession (Clemmesen and Kværnø, 2001; Krickus, 1998; Latawski, 1997; 
Lejinš, 2001; Staar, 1998), suggesting different frameworks and policy 
recommendations for successful enlargement (Kramer, 2002; Stefanova, 2002), 
analysing Russian viewpoint on the question and possible future relations between 
NATO and Russia (Black, 1999; Blank, 1998; Khudoley and Lanko, 2004; Rojansky, 
1999), but also between the Baltics and Russia (Mihkelson, 2003), and discussing 
security-related perceptions about the Baltics in the West (Mälksoo, 2004). With the 
accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO in early spring 2004, several of 
these research aspects became irrelevant. Post-accession research on the three Baltic 
States’ security and defence has had alternative, more diverse focus points. For 
example, scholars have looked at Baltic trilateral cooperation initiatives and their future 
perspectives after NATO accessions (Molis, 2009), changes in Baltic security 
perceptions (Jakniunaite, 2016), foreign policies after the accessions (Galbreath, Lašas 
and Lamoreaux, 2008), as well as relations with Russia and hybrid warfare (Nader, 
2017). Lamoreaux and Galbreath (2008) have analysed the Baltics as small states within 
the international system, claiming the three have gained more influence and agenda-
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setting power and, contrary to expectations, have also actively engaged in ‘East-West’ 
negotiations.  
Literature about the Nordic countries, on the other hand, has been quite different 
in its nature. Researchers have often discussed the ‘Nordic model’ or ‘Nordic balance’ 
of security policy and cooperation (Browning and Joenniemi, 2013; Forsberg, 2013; 
Rieker, 2004; Steinbock, 2008; Wivel, 2017) and changes in Nordic security after major 
events such as the end of Cold War, the Afghan war or the Ukraine conflict (Åtland, 
2016; Miller, 1990; Nordenman, 2014) as well as the Nordic countries’ contributions to 
NATO (Hendrickson, 1999; Ørvik, 1966). Within the Nordics, a question of major 
interest has been the militarily non-aligned status of Finland and Sweden. Authors have 
been looking for reasons behind Swedish and Finnish choice of abstaining form NATO 
membership, suggesting it could be due to either path dependency (Cottey, 2013), 
geopolitics and historical memory (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001) or evolving 
continuity (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006), as well as trying to explain Finnish and Swedish 
otherwise diverging defence policies (Möller and Bjereld, 2010), analysed their impact 
on Nordic and Nordic-Baltic cooperation (Winnerstig, 2014) and the possibility of 
NATO membership of both countries in the future (Austin, 1999; Lödén, 2012). 
Earlier research focusing on both Baltic and Nordic countries analysed the 
Nordic-Baltic security relationship of assistance and cooperation. The works of Clive 
Archer (1998; 1999) concentrate on examining the main security needs and challenges 
of the Baltic countries during and shortly after restoration of their independence and the 
Nordic states’ assistance in addressing these problems, which by Archer’s evaluation 
has been “considerable” (1999: 47), as well as on analysing the Nordics’ different 
choice of extent and means of assistance and looking for reasons behind the various 
approaches. Bergman (2006) sees the Nordics’ engagement in the Baltics as adjacent 
internationalism, which could have given rise to a distinctive Nordic-Baltic sphere of 
community. Even further on, there has been some discussion on whether the Baltic Sea 
region or the Nordic-Baltic area could be considered as a security community on its 
own, or whether it could form one in the future. Bailes (2010) has argued that security-
wise the variety between the states in the region is too big to constitute a unitary Nordic 
bloc, let alone a Nordic-Baltic bloc, and the existing Nordic cooperation is more of a 
compensation in its nature than a serious move towards convergence. Mouritzen has 
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estimated the enlargement potential of the Nordic security community towards the 
Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea to be “modest” (2001: 308). However, in his later work 
(Mouritzen, 2006), he refers to the region as Nordic-Baltic area and considers the three 
Baltic countries together with primarily Finland, Sweden and Denmark as one of the 
“two pillars of parallel action in Northern Europe” (2006: 496), the second one 
consisting of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. Even so, he questions 
the unity of the countries, referring to them as an area of “divisive geopolitics” 
(Mouritzen, 2006: 495) based on the countries’ different reactions to the Iraq War 
operation. Browning and Joenniemi (2004) on the other hand see security as a unifying, 
not a divisive topic in the region and have questioned sustainability of the future of 
regional cooperation in terms of the Baltics’ NATO accession “removing security from 
the frame” (2004: 233). When analysing forms of security cooperation in Europe, 
Mölder (2006) categorizes NATO and EU as examples of pluralistic security 
communities, but sees the Baltic Sea region not as a security community, but a regional 
security complex. Later, he has used the region as an example case for cooperative 
security dilemmas (Mölder, 2011). Winnerstig (2014) goes a little further and analyses 
also the concept of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) in greater detail, but concludes that 
forming “a true security community” (2014: 162) in the Nordic-Baltic area is impeded 
by issues related to strategic harmonisation and reluctance of Sweden and Finland to 
join NATO. The only research matters where the Nordic and Baltic states seem to be 
treated as a rather consistent entity are debates around the Nordic-Baltic area’s 
transatlantic relations and US-Nordic-Baltic multilateral security cooperation 
(Konyshev, Sergunin and Subbotin, 2016; Lundestad, 2017; McNamara, 2017; 
McNamara, Nordenman and Salonius-Pasternak, 2015). 
Throughout this former research, NATO as the major defence alliance in the 
region has often been considered as an actor within the system. For some interest areas, 
such as the cases of Finland, Sweden and the three Baltics’ potential membership of 
NATO or the region’s transatlantic cooperation, it has been observed in somewhat 
greater detail, but a large share of the mentioned works have had their centre of 
attention elsewhere. The interaction between NATO and its member and partner 
countries has overall received rather little discussion (Cottey, 2013: 468-469). Timothy 
Edmunds (2003) has analysed NATO’s influence on its new members who joined in 
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1999 and 2004, however, as he did his research before the actual accession of seven out 
of ten new member states had happened, the focus is rather on how NATO ‘prepares’ its 
candidate states, arguing that the impact on the countries’ civil-military and military 
reforms have been major. Some research trying to determine the role and impact of 
NATO has been carried out for the cases Poland and the Czech Republic (Frank, 2010), 
but similarly to Edmunds’ work, the analysis does not go much further from the 
accession period. Hence, understanding the interaction between NATO and its member 
and partner countries can be considered a gap in literature, to filling of which this thesis 
aims to contribute. 
 Therefore, while scholars have in the past analysed security and defence 
cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries from many focus points and in 
terms of several theoretical approaches, it has mainly been considered, at least regarding 
the period after the Baltics’ accession to NATO, as rather weak and not extensively 
collective – by any means not enough to qualify as a unified community. However, as 
the previous research concerning this matter dates back to earlier than 2014, it is now 
well justified to analyse the relations in the region once again, primarily to see whether 
an escalated security threat in the close vicinity has changed the Nordic-Baltic 
perspectives on regional cooperation. In addition, despite literature on NATO being 
extensive, determining the strategic impact of NATO on its member and partner 
countries can be considered as a gap in literature in general. While the Nordic-Baltic 
region with its heterogeneous choice of security alignment, but closely related national 
securities and security concerns could well work as an example region for comparative 
analysis, the thesis will seek to contribute to filling this research gap by looking at how 
NATO’s objectives have been integrated into the member and partner states’ national 
defence policies. Altogether, analysing the two aspects would allow drawing 
conclusions on countries’ perceptions of cooperative security. Results of the work could 
prove useful in several ways: firstly, in better understanding the dynamics of Baltic Sea 
region’s defence environment and NATO’s role in it as well as providing comparative 
knowledge on Nordic-Baltic countries; secondly, in general understanding of member 
states’ and partners’ relating to NATO through national level; thirdly, in evaluating the 
potential perspectives of security and defence cooperation’s future in the Nordic-Baltic 
area; furthermore, in contributing to theoretical comprehension of regional cooperative 
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security through a case study; and finally, in providing background knowledge that 
could help to develop well-informed policy decisions in the future, likewise in terms of 
national context as well as of bi- or multilateral cooperation projects both in the Nordic-
Baltic area and elsewhere. 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the Nordic and Baltic countries’ 
perceptions of shared security. This will be done from two perspectives. Firstly, 
regarding the countries’ affiliation to NATO – the broader security structure influencing 
and participating in the region’s security policies. The objective is to analyse the 
intersection between NATO’s strategic aims and the ones of the seven countries in 
question, and how the countries strategically identify with NATO’s objectives on 
national level. Secondly, the thesis will consider the Nordic-Baltic regional cooperation, 
to analyse the countries’ aims regarding regional security and defence cooperation in 
the changed security environment. The thesis seeks to respond to two main research 
questions: 
 
1) How do Nordic and Baltic countries relate to NATO’s strategic aims and 
objectives? 
2) What are Nordic and Baltic countries’ regional cooperation interests in the 
changed security environment? 
 
 To answer the two questions, the thesis will place the current security situation 
of Baltic and Nordic countries and NATO into the theory of regional security 
complexes, relying on the discourse of the Copenhagen School of international 
relations. The empirical analysis will be carried out using qualitative content analysis, 
based on the strategic concept of NATO, adopted in 2010, and the most recent official 
national strategic documents on security and defence adopted in each of the seven 
countries of Nordic-Baltic area – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. Since Iceland, the eighth country related to the Nordic community and 
the Nordic-Baltic Eight, is quite a distinctive phenomenon in terms of security, being 
located in a remote area and having no standing army, it will not be included in the 
research as doing so would not add any extra value. 
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The thesis is structured into four main chapters. The first chapter begins with 
introducing the research field and relevant theoretical frameworks regarding security 
cooperation. It then outlines the primary principles of the Copenhagen School of 
security studies and discusses the theory of regional security complexes (RSCT), 
explaining the central concept and relevant theoretical aspects, as well as outlining the 
theoretical assumptions of the thesis. The second chapter will introduce the 
methodological aspects of the thesis, clarifying the choice of methods and the sources of 
empirical data. The section continues with operationalization and finally outlines 
limitations of the research project. The third chapter focuses on the first research 
question: it begins with giving an overview of emergence and development of NATO’s 
strategic concept, and proceeds to discuss the ways in which the Nordic-Baltic countries 
relate to NATO through their strategic aims based on an empirical analysis of their 
security and defence concepts. The fourth chapter, dedicated to the second research 
question, concentrates on the cooperative security connections between the seven states, 
presenting the empirical results and discussing the countries’ perceptions of a Nordic-
Baltic security community in the post-2014 security landscape. The final section of the 
thesis draws conclusions and sums up the research. 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The first chapter deals with the theoretical aspects of the thesis, which is 
necessary for placing and understanding the research puzzle within the wider 
discussions of international relations and security studies. The first section of the 
chapter introduces the research field and relevant theoretical frameworks regarding 
security cooperation. The second section then outlines the primary principles of the 
Copenhagen School of security studies and further discusses the central theoretical 
framework of the thesis, the theory of regional security complexes (RSCT), explaining 
the central concept and relevant theoretical aspects. Then, based on the first two 
subchapters, the third section outlines theoretical assumptions of the current thesis. 
 
1.1. Theorising Security and Security Cooperation 
 
Before moving to discussion on different approaches to security cooperation, a 
reasonable starting point would be to first clarify the understanding of the concept of 
security. Since the emergence of international relations (IR) as a research field – and 
security studies as a sub-discipline of it – nearly a century ago, many authors have 
suggested ways of defining security. According to Collins (2016: 1-3, 446, 451), there 
has been a consensus on the matter that security studies have to do with threats; yet 
determining what ‘threats’ entails has not been this simple – in addition to traditional, 
geopolitical aspects like war and use of force in general, dangers can also range further, 
emerging in non-military forms such as environmental issues, pandemics and similar 
health-related threats, or as terrorism or inter-state armed conflicts. With the growing 
importance of information technology solutions in everyday lives as well as state 
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matters, cyber security and energy security, but also psychological security, have grown 
to be of higher priority than ever before, and defending against all methods of hybrid 
warfare has attained a crucial position in defence matters. Such emergence and 
development of new types of threats makes grasping the concept of security more and 
more difficult. Taking account of these developments, Collins provides a particularly 
wide definition, coining security as “the assurance people have that they will continue 
to enjoy those things that are most important to their survival and well-being” (2016: 
450).   
Approaches and theories of security studies largely follow the traditional 
international relations disciplines, such as realism and liberalism, and their central ideas; 
yet, the field also allows for some alternative approaches. Several of the theoretical 
branches also entail a way of investigating and explaining security cooperation.  
Drawing on state- and power-centred realist idea, Kenneth Waltz has within structural 
realism introduced the concept of balancing. He argues that states, in order to pursue 
policies of their interest in competitive international system, are looking to increase 
their ability to defend themselves. They can do it either through internal or external 
balancing – either by increasing the state’s own economic and military capabilities, or 
in case there are three or more major powers in the system, by forming alliances with 
other states and through that gaining the opportunity to additionally rely on other states’ 
resources. In a balancing alliance, weaker states join their forces in order to balance or 
offset the prevailing power of the stronger actor. (Glaser, 2016: 17-19) Power balancing 
might also be executed in order to reduce political marginalisation and by spreading 
dependency (Mouritzen, 2006: 499). Alternatively, motivational realism emphasises 
variation in states’ aims and goals instead of primarily seeking security, and 
motivational realists argue that competition in international system is caused by greedy 
states. Greedy states are more likely to form alliances via bandwagoning, i.e. joining the 
stronger side in order to more potentially gain from the alliance. (Glaser, 2016: 25-26) 
Yet, as realist approaches are based on a strictly materialist idea, they would not be 
sufficient for understanding perceptions of security sharing. 
As the central focus point of the thesis is on perceptions of security, security 
cannot be understood as rigidly material, but also as a social notion. This leads further 
to constructivist understanding of international relations and security studies. 
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Constructivist approach focuses on interactions in international system through ideas 
and identity, stating that the world is a social construction, created through actions of 
the actors – either states or non-states – within the system, contradicting some other 
international relations’ theories’ belief of them being given or inevitable (Agius, 2016: 
70-71). Alexander Wendt, one of the main authors of constructivism, summarises the 
basic principles of constructivist thought as “(1) that the structures of human association 
are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the 
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
than given by nature” (1999: 1). In constructivist view of inter-actor relations there is, 
hence, no objective reality, brute facts or certain, prescribed way of the world, but 
instead everything depends on how the actors within the system socially construct it. 
Understanding the international system centres around ideas and normative structures, 
actors’ identities are the source of their interests, values, beliefs and norms, and are 
constituted through interaction, whereas agents and structures are constituted mutually 
(Agius, 2016: 71). Yet, decades before Wendt wrote his works and constructivism 
started developing as a theoretical approach of international relations, an explanation of 
cooperation between states, bearing the constructivist idea, was presented by Karl 
Deutsch. The theoretical concept of a ‘security community’ was first introduced by 
Deutsch in 1957, and has been complemented and enhanced by several authors since. 
The central idea of security communities is that certain states have, on the basis of a 
‘sense of community’, become integrated enough that they can not see war or other 
large-scale violent action as a thinkable option for dealing with their differences. 
Instead, issues are solved with the help of peaceful change processes, which eventually 
results in creating a stable peace between the countries. (Tusicisny, 2007: 426) Key to 
this underlying of ‘sense of community’ lies in complex interdependence, especially 
economic interdependence, shared (liberal democratic) values and common identity 
(Mölder, 2006: 11). The approach distinguishes between amalgamated and pluralistic 
security communities. Deutsch (1957: 6) characterises amalgamated security 
community as a larger formally merged unit that has been made up of previously 
independent units, for example the United States, and pluralistic security community as 
one in which the integrating units retain legal independence and in which there are 
therefore several decision-making centres, such as territories of the US and Canada 
 20 
combined. In European case, NATO and the European Union have been considered as 
preeminent security communities, whereas Scandinavia or the ‘Norden’ region has been 
considered as “the standard example” of a security community (Waever, 1998: 72, 91-
92). Adler and Barnett (1998) have further worked on the evolution of security 
communities, identifying three stages of the process: nascent, ascendant and mature; 
and differentiated them by level of integration into tightly and loosely coupled security 
communities. 
Furthermore, besides security communities, three other models within post-
modern security architecture have been observed according to Mölder (2006): 
cooperative security arrangements, collective security arrangements and security 
complexes (see Table 1 for comprehensive comparison). He describes cooperative 
security arrangements as security formations around security communities, where 
security and defence cooperation is promoted and the participating countries are 
therefore interdependent. Cooperative security arrangements can be both 
institutionalised or non-institutionalised, and do not necessarily base themselves on 
value sharing but rather on working towards peace and security through cooperative 
security measures. Collective security arrangements aim to broaden interests to a 
regional or global level and attract everyone without any dividing lines. The mechanism 
of such arrangement is inward, built on the members’ agreement not to use force against 
each other, and the notion that any such aggression would be opposed by other members 
(Cohen, 2001: 6). The concept of security complex follows the idea of a group of states 
whose security concerns are interconnected to the extent that considering their national 
securities as separate is not be reasonable (Mölder, 2006: 15); this approach will be 
discussed further in the following subchapter. 
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Security 
community 
Cooperative 
security 
arrangement 
Collective 
security 
arrangement 
Security 
complex 
Method of 
communication 
Complex 
interdependence 
Cooperation 
Institutionalised 
cooperation 
Regionalisation 
Value sharing Yes No No No 
Existence of 
security 
dilemma 
No Cooperative 
Traditional 
and/or 
cooperative 
Traditional 
and/or 
cooperative 
Security regimes 
Collective 
defence and/or 
collective 
security 
Collective 
security 
Collective 
security 
Promoting 
stability 
Contemporary 
example cases NATO; EU 
PfP; 
Mediterranean 
Dialogue; 
Istanbul 
Cooperation 
Initiative; EU 
Neighbourhood 
Policy, etc. 
United Nations; 
Organization for 
Security and Co-
operation in 
Europe 
Baltic Sea; 
Black Sea; 
Balkans, etc. 
Table 1. Security models and post-modern security architecture in Europe. Based on Mölder 
(2006, pp.14-15). 
 
 When aiming to locate the geographic focus area of this thesis within the 
proposed models, part of it according to the discussion above could qualify as a security 
community (see Waever’s ‘Norden’ claim above). Yet it is more limited than what 
Mölder argues to be the security complex of Baltic Sea, as the Baltic Sea region also 
comprises (at least parts of) Russia, Germany and Poland. In earlier research, scholars 
have generally neglected the Nordic-Baltic area as a security community of its own 
(Bailes, 2010: 14-15; Mölder, 2006: 25; Mouritzen, 2008: 301; Winnerstig, 2014: 216). 
On the other hand, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998: 14) have argued that there is no 
separate Nordic security complex, because there is no territorial pattern of security 
interdependence of the Nordic states only that would be distinctive enough, and the 
Nordic countries are a part of European security complex instead. However, relying on 
the security models’ characteristics presented in Table 1, the Nordic-Baltic area is most 
compatible with the model of security complex, as their cooperation does not follow a 
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collective security regime. Furthermore, reflecting back to the conceptualisation of 
security discussed in the beginning of this chapter, present-day security field is about 
much more than just military security. In order to grasp these different aspects of 
security in the empirical part, e.g. also deal with modern security challenges such as 
cyber security and information warfare, a broader approach appears necessary. These 
notions direct the discussion towards regional security complex theory and the wider 
discourse of the Copenhagen School, which will be further discussed in the following 
subchapter. 
 
 
1.2. Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
 
1.2.1. The Copenhagen School 
 
The term ‘Copenhagen School in security studies’ refers first and foremost to 
works of scholars from Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) – most 
importantly Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, who are also the authors of 
the key texts of the approach, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” (1997), and 
Buzan additionally of the cornerstone work, “People, States and Fear: The National 
Security Problem in International Relations” (1983). In 1980s, after finding the 
traditional security approaches too limited, they introduced a broader approach, which 
distinguishes five general security categories. The categorisation is based on different 
sources of threat – military, political, economic, environmental, and societal. The 
division is said to serve mainly analytical purposes and the categories are hence not 
exclusive from each other. (Persaud, 2016: 147) The Copenhagen Schools combines 
traditional understanding of security with non-traditional in a way, as it still stresses 
security being about survival in general and threats to security being of existential 
nature; yet, the mentioned categories broaden the concept of security with referent 
objects other than state, and enhance the survival logic further off beyond the 
boundaries of military security (Emmers, 2016: 168-169). As its main contribution to 
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security studies, the Copenhagen School has developed the model and analytical 
framework of securitization. 
 
 
1.2.2. Securitization 
 
Understanding the fundamentals of securitization is of crucial importance for 
further discussions within the approach of the Copenhagen School. In simple terms, 
securitization means framing a public concern as a security issue. Buzan, Waever and 
de Wilde refrain from defining the concept of securitization in itself as they indicate that 
“the concept lies in its usage” (1998: 24), but do note that securitization could be 
understood as a more extreme version of politicization, i.e. “the issue is presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the 
normal bounds of political procedure” (1998: 23-24). Securitization process does not 
necessarily have to happen through the state but could be done by any other actor who 
is able to raise a concern as much that it becomes an issue of general concern; 
furthermore, any public issue can be securitized as long as it can be argued to be of 
uttermost priority and that not handling it can make everything else irrelevant (Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24).  
Securitization model allows classifying the concerns along securitization 
spectrum (see Figure 1). The spectrum depicts the two-stage process where every matter 
can be non-politicized, politicized or securitized. A non-politicized matter is an issue 
that is not on the state agenda and not involved in the public debate. The issue has 
become politicized, if it has become a matter of standard political system and decisions 
on the matter are made on government level as a part of public policy. When it is further 
moved towards the end of the spectrum and becomes securitized, and is presented as a 
case of existential threat requiring emergency measures of action. (Emmers, 2016: 169-
170) The placement of issues on the spectrum depends of circumstances of each, but is, 
in principle, open; in practice it varies considerably from state to state, e.g. in cases of 
securitizing religion or culture (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24). The process of 
securitization can be also carried out in reverse, as desecuritization – from securitized 
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matter to politicized one, that is, from the level of existential threat back to the stage 
where it is managed within regular political procedures (Emmers, 2016: 170). 
 
Figure 1. Securitization spectrum. (Emmers, 2016: 170) 
 
Following Emmers (2016: 170-173), the key aspect within the securitization 
spectrum is the speech act, which is considered to be the starting point of securitization 
process. If an issue is articulated as an existential threat in the speech act, it can be 
securitized regardless of whether it actually represents one or is even a question of 
security. A crucial point in the securitizing action is convincing the relevant audience 
about a referent object being threatened, typically using security language. The objects 
could be individuals, groups or issue areas that “possess a legitimate claim to survival 
and whose existence is ostensibly threatened” (2016: 171), and the audience most often 
political elites, public opinion, military officers, or other elites. The speech act is 
considered successful in case it provides the securitizing actors (political elite, military, 
civil society) with the right to use exceptional means. A crucial part of securitization is 
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emphasising the existential nature of the threat, which also helps to avoid the 
conceptualisation of security broadening too much and does not allow it to lose its 
coherence around the core notion of survival. On the other hand, the power of speech 
act confirms that security is a socially constructed, “self-referential practice” (Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24). 
 
 
1.2.2. Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
As mentioned above, to the Copenhagen School scholars, security is a relational 
matter – it depends on how actors relate to each other in terms of threats. The 
Copenhagen School explains cooperation between states through security complex 
theory, as they claim regional level is the arena where “the extremes of national and 
global level interplay” (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 43). They further justify stronger 
placement of the central focus of security studies on regions with the collapse of 
bipolarity, stating that in the post-Cold War world, international relations will be more 
regionalized as global great powers no longer have the ideology-based interest to 
interfere and regions will be “left to sort out their own affairs” (Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde, 1998: 9). Scholars of the Copenhagen School have presented two levels of the 
theory: first, the classical security complex theory (CSCT) in Barry Buzan’s “People, 
States and Fear” (first presented in 1983, updated and revised in the edition of 1991), 
and second, the regional security complex theory (RSCT), presented in “Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis” (1997) by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde. Later on, Buzan 
and Waever have applied the RSCT on case studies worldwide in their book “Regions 
and Powers” (2003). This section will begin with clarifying the concept of security 
complex and outlining the main points of the classical version of the approach, and 
thereafter focuses on discussing regional security complex theory. 
The classical security complex theory stems from the belief that security 
analysis cannot be sufficient around isolated objects, but the latter must be studied in a 
broader context so as to make it possible to understand the interdependence the object is 
embedded in. Therefore, the objects of analysis are regional subsystems. However, 
classical security complexes follow traditional security approaches with having state as 
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the key unit and political-military sector as their focus. The purpose of the framework is 
to “highlight the relative autonomy of regional security relations and to set those 
relations within the context of the unit (state) and system levels” (Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde, 1998: 11). It is argued that international security is integrated insufficiently and 
political and military threats do not travel well over long distances. As a result, security 
interdependence leads to regional clusters in which the interdependence between the 
states included is remarkably higher than with states outside – security complexes. 
(Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 10-11) Buzan and associates define security 
complex as “a group of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so 
interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another” (1998: 12). They further state that internal dynamics 
of such complexes can be driven by either enmity or amity: interdependence can take a 
form of conflict formation in the negative end to pluralistic security community in the 
positive end, or between the two, take shape of a security regime where states see each 
other as potential threats, but diminish the dilemma with joint reassurance agreements. 
With this, security complex theory makes itself also compatible with other approaches, 
e.g. Deutsch’s security communities or Jervis’ security regimes. The CSCT framework 
allows, by analysing essential structure (arrangement and differentiation of units; amity 
and enmity patterns; power distribution) in a classical security complex, to assess 
change in the complex: the result could be either maintenance of the status quo, internal 
transformation, external transformation, or overlay. (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 
1998: 12-14) However, the classical security complex theory started losing its initial 
relevance in the light of the Copenhagen School’s general broadening of security as a 
concept. 
 Regional security complex theory opens the analysis for other sectors beyond 
political-military one, and other actors besides states. The approach offers two ways for 
this: homogeneous complexes and heterogeneous complexes. The former continues 
with the assumption that complexes are made up within sectors and between similar 
actors (e.g. states within military complexes, identity-based actors in societal 
complexes, etc.), while the latter allows integration of different types of actors as well 
as several sectors. (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 16) According to this 
broadening, also the definition of security complexes was revised: a regional security 
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complex is claimed to be “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, 
desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde, 1998: 201). Compared to CSCT, the complexes according to RSCT have some 
changes in characteristics. Essential structure of a regional security complex (RSC) 
entails four variables: 1) boundary (differentiation from neighbours), 2) anarchic 
structure (composition of at least two autonomous units), 3) polarity (power distribution 
among units), and 4) social construction (internal patterns of amity and enmity). 
Evolutions of RSCs exclude the option of overlay – external involvement to the extent 
that local security patterns cease to exist – and this is considered as an absence of a 
regional security complex instead. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53)  
 RSCT further develops a typology of regional security complexes, 
differentiating between standard and centred RSCs and various forms of these (Buzan 
and Waever, 2003: 53-61). However as categorizing security complexes is not of 
substantial importance in the current research, this part of the theory will not be 
introduced in greater detail. Yet, it is worthy studying one more concept within RSCT, 
which is subcomplex. Buzan and Waever describe subcomplex as “a ‘half-level’ within 
the regional one”, which “represent distinctive patterns of security interdependence that 
are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole” (2003: 
51). Moreover, they note that a subcomplex essentially does not differ from an RSC in 
ways other than being embedded within a larger RSC (2003: 51). 
Regional security complex theory offers a framework for empirical studies of 
regional security – descriptive RSCT, providing four levels of analysis to work with. 
The aim of the framework is to present a possibility to systematically link the different 
levels within a regional security complex, and to provide a way to generate reference 
points which can be used to identify and determine change on the regional level. (Buzan 
and Waever, 2003: 51-53) The levels are presented in Table 2. Based on the descriptive 
framework, Buzan and Waever have also developed a predictive RSCT framework, 
which can be used to generate predictive scenarios in regions (2003: 65). 
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 Level Clarification 
1 Domestic in the states 
of the region 
In particular the states’ domestically generated vulnerabilities, to 
analyse strength of the state based on domestic order, the kind of 
its security fears, etc. 
2 State-to-state relations Relations which generate the region as such 
 
3 The region’s 
interaction with 
neighbouring regions 
Relatively limited aspect; considerable in case of major changes 
in the patterns that define complexes and in situations of gross 
asymmetries 
4 The role of global 
powers in the region 
Interplay between the global and regional security structures   
 
Table 2. Descriptive RSCT analytical framework. Based on Buzan and Waever. (2003: 51) 
 
 
1.3. Theoretical Assumptions 
 
 On the theoretical ground, the research to be conducted will be mainly working 
with three of the four levels presented in Table 2: domestic (level one), state-to-state 
(level two) and global powers (level four). The analysis classifies as of a heterogeneous 
complex, as it does not necessarily limit security to military-political sector, although 
key units of security are states. 
 The first research interest of the thesis engages the domestic and global power 
levels, focusing mainly on the actions regarding the fourth level, a global player, yet 
does that through lens of the domestic level – the primary interest is on the intersection 
of the two. The first assumption of the thesis posits the strategic intersection between 
the two levels, relying in part on the concept of bandwagoning, in part on security 
communities:   
 
H1: States that identify with the global power more closely are also more eager 
to relate to the global power strategically. 
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 Within the regional security complex theory, the case study of Nordic-Baltic 
area could in empirical analysis be handled as a subcomplex. According to Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde (1998: 12), regional security complexes cannot be formed at 
random, but by following a “distinctive territorial pattern of security interdependence”. 
The Copenhagen School scholars treat Europe as one RSC and deny Nordic countries 
forming a separate one. Based on this logic, this thesis will treat Nordic-Baltic area as a 
potential subcomplex. Therefore, the second half of the empirical part to follow will 
deal with analysis within level two and examine patterns of amity and enmity in the 
subcomplex. In addition, level three cannot be implicitly excluded from this analysis as 
the main influential developments are coming for outside the subcomplex. However, as 
the influential developments in themselves (in this case, strengthening of a common 
proximate threat) are not examined in the research, but rather taken as an established 
reality, the focus is on relations within the subcomplex. The thesis will posit the idea 
that the countries of the subcomplex, being already closely interdependent in security, 
would in their actions follow tendencies of power balancing rather than bandwagoning, 
and that it could thus be assumed that their interests of becoming even firmer in their 
cooperation and degree of amity in the subcomplex would grow. The second 
assumption is stated as follows:  
 
H2: Strengthening of a common proximate threat makes states enhance 
cooperation and move towards higher amity. 
  
 Operationalization and specification of the assumptions on the level of the case 
study will be carried out in the methodological chapter (section 2.2.). 
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2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
The second chapter will introduce the methodological aspects of the thesis and 
describe the research design. Its first subchapter clarifies the choice of method, sources 
of empirical data, and the process of data collection and analysis. The section continues 
with the operationalization, defining the research questions and assumptions in further 
detail, while the third subchapter will outline the limitations of the research project. 
 
2.1. Choice of Method and Sources of Empirical Data 
 
 Based on the qualitative nature of the research puzzle and research questions as 
well as of the empirical data sources, the methodology of the thesis is accordingly also 
qualitative. The empirical research in the thesis will be carried out according to the 
methodological practices of qualitative content analysis. With seven countries and one 
organisation as research objects, it qualifies as a small-n study. 
 Source of the empirical data used for analysis is strategic documentation, as this 
is supposedly the most relevant and comprehensive source where a country’s or 
organisation’s standpoints and future aims are represented. In order to find answers to 
the research questions posed, the source documents must be timely, accurate and 
comparable. Therefore, when choosing the appropriate documentation for each country, 
two criteria were applied: 1) time – the documents should be as recent as possible and 
adopted not before the year 2014, in order to reflect the most accurate positions in the 
current security environment; and 2) content – the documents should cover security and 
defence sectors. All documents used are official public strategic documents published 
by government sources. As text is the key element of qualitative analysis, consideration 
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was given to language aspect as well. In the interest of maximum coherence over the 
analysis, documents in English were preferred. However, as it was not possible in each 
case to fill the time relevance criteria by using English language documents, also 
sources in Estonian, Swedish and Norwegian were used. Where possible, the documents 
in English were also compared to the original documents in the official language to 
verify their conformity. In cases where a citation from any of the Swedish, Norwegian 
or Estonian language documents is used in the empirical part, it should be considered as 
the author’s translation, unless noted otherwise specifically. Regarding the time criteria, 
an exception is the strategic concept of NATO, which was adopted in 2010, but has not 
been reviewed since; hence there is no updated alternative that could be used for 
determining the strategic position of NATO. Regarding some countries’ strategies, two 
separate documents were used in order to by large cover the main security and defence 
topics. The full list of documents used for collecting empirical data is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
 Work with data sources was conducted in three steps. First, the security concept 
of NATO was analysed and categorised following the pattern of the concept – the aims 
described by NATO were categorised in three groups, by three main topics or core tasks 
of the concept. These are defence and deterrence, crisis management, and promoting 
international security through cooperation. Each core task includes a number of smaller 
aims that are set to achieve the key objectives; all these were included in the analysis as 
each forming a category (see Appendix 2 for full list of objectives). Next, all national 
documents were analysed and relevant information in these coded according to the 
categories. The results of this step form the basis of chapter three of the thesis, in which 
the countries’ viewpoints regarding these categories are compared and analysed. The 
structure of the chapter follows the pattern of the categories within core tasks, and in the 
final part the overall trends are discussed. In the final step, the national documents were 
gone through once more to determine statements regarding Nordic-Baltic cooperation. 
In order to do this, keywords ‘Nordic’, ‘Baltic’ and names of all the Nordic-Baltic 
countries were applied to the countries’ strategic documents. The results then were used 
as the basis of analysis in chapter four, for discussing the Nordic and Baltic countries’ 
interests and plans regarding cooperation with each other. 
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2.2. Research Questions and Operationalization 
 
 The research project aims to understand the Nordic and Baltic countries’ 
perceptions of security cooperation on two levels: within the framework of NATO, and 
regionally between the countries of the area. The analysis is conducted through two 
central research questions: 
 
1) How do Nordic and Baltic countries relate to NATO’s strategic aims and 
objectives? 
 
2) What are Nordic and Baltic countries’ regional cooperation interests in the 
changed security environment? 
 
These questions are sought to be answered through the theoretical framework of 
regional security complexes, and national strategic documentation is implemented as a 
source of security perceptions.  
  
The thesis has two theoretical assumptions: 
 
H1: States that identify with the global power more closely are also more eager 
to relate to the global power strategically. 
 
H2: Strengthening of a common proximate threat makes states enhance 
cooperation and move towards higher amity. 
 
These will be tested in the case study of Nordic-Baltic area. As the Nordic-Baltic 
area on its own does not fully comply with the theoretical prerequisites of a 
regional security complex, it will be treated as a subcomplex within a larger RSC of 
Europe. NATO as a major Euro-Atlantic organization that engages in military-
political and other security-related matters represents a global power. Observable 
implications in empirical data would be 1) a high degree of common strategic aims 
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for relating to the global power strategically, i.e. strategic intersections between 
strategic concept of NATO and national documents; 2) distinction between 
membership and partnership for identifying with the global power, i.e. closeness to 
NATO regarding whether the country is a member state or a partner state of NATO; 
and 3) expressing a will and aim of cooperative security efforts in the area for 
enhancing cooperation and moving towards higher amity. Strengthening of a 
common proximate threat is not separately examined in the research, but rather 
taken as an established reality, which for the case study is interpreted as military 
strengthening and aggressive behaviour of Russia. Therefore, the assumptions if 
applied on the case study level are the following: 
 
h1: Member states of NATO have higher strategic intersections with 
NATO compared to partner states of NATO in the Nordic-Baltic area. 
 
h2: Military strengthening and aggressive behaviour of Russia makes the 
countries of Nordic-Baltic area aim towards enhanced cooperative 
security efforts in the area. 
 
 
2.3. Limitations 
 
 As any research project, the thesis also has its flaws, which should be clarified 
before proceeding to the chapters of empirical data and analysis. 
 Firstly, possible weaknesses of material should be noted. Empirical data used in 
the study will be limited to official sources with open access to anyone. This may set 
some limitations of accuracy while determining the countries’ or NATO’s security 
views and strategic aims, as there is no access to additional classified information such 
as diplomatic notes, confidential documents, etc. which could also contain relevant 
information. What is more, it should also be kept in mind that the strategic documents 
of each country essentially follow their own norms and therefore may not be all-
inclusive. Therefore, data should not be over-interpreted – e.g. the lack of positions and 
aims regarding nuclear weapons in the strategic documentation of Denmark does not 
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necessarily mean that Denmark lacks an overall standpoint about nuclear weapons in its 
national policy as a whole. 
 Another shortcoming might be related to subjectivity. The process of qualitative 
analysis is built up in a way that always leaves space for interpretations, allowing some 
subjective perceptions of the person conducting the research play a role in coding and 
categorizing the data to some extent. In some cases, lines between categories or codes 
can be unclear or the data could be presented in a way that allows it to interpreted in 
slightly different ways. However, as in the current case the entire research is conducted 
by one author, the interpretations ought to be consistent as much as possible. 
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3. PERCEPTIONS OF NATO COOPERATION 
 
 The following section of the thesis aims to answer the first research question – 
how do Nordic and Baltic countries relate to NATO’s strategic aims and objectives? In 
this chapter, the data gathered from national security and defence strategy documents 
and NATO’s strategic concept will be analysed comparatively. The first section will 
give a brief overview of strategic concepts of NATO in general and of the current 
version adopted in 2010. The second, third and fourth section are devoted to analysis 
between strategies, each addressing one of the three essential core aims presented in 
NATO’s concept. The final section will discuss the overall findings. 
  
 
3.1. Strategic Concept of NATO 
 
 The first strategic concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was 
adopted shortly after its foundation: dated 1 December 1949 and named The Strategic 
Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area. The main function of NATO was in 
this concept declared to be deterring aggression, and additionally, that a case where this 
function failed and an attack was launched, was the only situation where NATO forces 
would engage. In 1950, a strategic guidance for regional planning and a medium term 
plan were added to the initial concept. Renewals to documents were done in 1952, and 
by 1957, these were all merged into Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the 
NATO Area. Since then, the concepts have been adopted as single documents – in 1968, 
1991, 1999, and 2010. The concept issued in 1991 was the first unclassified strategic 
concept of NATO, and as such the first one that was released to the public. Since 1954, 
the strategic concepts have been accompanied by implementation documents. (NATO, 
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2017; see Figure 2) In line with the evolution of strategic concepts, NATO distinguishes 
three periods in its strategic thinking: 1) the Cold War period, 2) the immediate post-
Cold War period, and 3) the post-9/11 environment. During the first period, NATO’s 
strategic focus was mainly on defence and deterrence. Towards the end of the Cold 
War, more consideration was given to dialogue, and since 1991 the concept was 
broadened to additionally include notions of cooperation. The terrorist attacks of 2001 
brought fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into 
greater focus. In the light of new emerging threats, e.g. cyber crime and energy security, 
a new concept was issued in 2010. (NATO, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1999. (NATO, 2017) 
 
The most recent and currently effective strategic concept was adopted at the 
NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 with the upcoming decade in mind, and is 
by subheading called “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”. The concept is 
accompanied by the Military Committee Guidance MC 400/3 from March 2012. 
Compared to earlier strategic documents, the 2010 concept is considered to be 
outstanding due to broadened reflections, consultations, drafting and debates between 
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Allies in the producing process, with contributions from experts and interested public; 
additionally, the debate was for the first time initiated and steered by a NATO Secretary 
General. (NATO, 2017) The concept consists of seven chapters. The first one indicates 
NATO’s core tasks and principles: most importantly “safeguarding the freedom and 
security of all its members by political and military means” (Strategic …, 2010: 6). 
Furthermore, it emphasizes NATO member states’ value commitments, strength of the 
transatlantic link, commitment to NATO’s role as a forum for consultations, 
engagement in reform and modernisation, and reassures engagement in fulfilling the 
three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security 
(Strategic …, 2010: 6-9). The second chapter describes NATO’s standpoints regarding 
the state of affairs in global security environment. Further on, there are three chapters 
dedicated to each of the three core tasks noted above, and the last two sections sum up 
NATO’s goals regarding reform and modernisation in order to stay abreast of the 21st 
century security challenges. (Strategic …, 2010) Within the following sections, the 
three chapters concerning the core tasks will be discussed in greater detail. All of the 
statements ascribed to NATO below originate from the 2010 strategic concept, unless 
specifically noted otherwise. 
 
3.2. Defence and Deterrence 
 
 The objective of collective defence and deterrence is one of the cornerstones of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As the central principle of the defence and 
deterrence core task, the 2010 strategic concept states the following: “NATO members 
will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and 
defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where 
they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.” 
(Strategic …, 2010: 7) The strategic chapter on the core task embodies a comprehensive 
overview of NATO’s aims regarding capabilities it intends to maintain, further develop 
and obtain in order to fulfil the core task of defence and deterrence against both existing 
and emerging threats (NATO, 2017). 
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 Closely associated with Article 5, protection and defence of the Alliance’s 
territory and populations against attack is a primary interest of NATO. As sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and well-being of the population are also fundamentals of the 
security of a state, coinciding principles are represented in all of the Nordic-Baltic 
countries’ security strategies. In addition, the main referent objects of national security 
include human rights, political freedom, democratic values, constitutional order, the rule 
of law, and internal security of the state. Norway (Setting …, 2017: 11) and Estonia 
(Eesti …, 2017: 3, 9) stress NATO’s and Article 5’s fundamental importance in 
fulfilling these tasks. Denmark (Defence …, 2018: 3) also mentions the importance of 
NATO’s collective defence principle, however states that “first and last”, the Danish 
defence is to protect Denmark. This statement acquires a larger meaning considering 
that Denmark has opted out of all security and defence frameworks within the European 
Union. Sweden takes a similar stance, noting that the defence capability of Sweden is 
ultimately aimed at the protection of its own territory (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 1), 
which however reasonably lines up with Sweden’s abstention from military alignment. 
Estonia’s security concept takes a strong position specifically regarding territorial 
integrity, stating that its land and sea territories as well as air and cyber space will be 
defended “by any means and against any, no matter how overwhelming, opponent” 
(Eesti …, 2017: 10). As Estonia shares a land border with Russia and its eastern areas 
are in a large share populated with ethnic Russians, based on analogies with Eastern 
Ukraine, such statement could be interpreted as making an implicit reference to Russia. 
 NATO claims deterrence to be its core strategic element, and strategic nuclear 
forces to be a supreme guarantee of security. Therefore, it aims to maintain an 
“appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces” (Strategic …, 2010: 15). In 
national documentation, the element of deterrence and its centrality clearly follows the 
distinction line between member and partner states of NATO. Whereas all member 
states emphasize the crucial position of deterrence in their defence strategies – e.g. 
Norway lists providing deterrence as the primary task of its defence sector (Kampkraft 
…, 2016: 6), Lithuania indicates ensuring credible deterrence as “[t]he foundation of 
defence of the Republic of Lithuania” (National …, 2017: 8), etc. – Finland remains 
modest with noting that defence cooperation strengthens deterrence (Government’s …, 
2017: 16), and Sweden refrains from using the concept in general (Försvarspolitisk …, 
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2015). On the nuclear guarantee argument, national positions are more conservative, but 
outline another notable pattern. None of the four Nordic countries has included the 
statements regarding nuclear forces in their strategies, yet the points are represented in 
all three Baltic countries’ documents. Lithuanian concept briefly mentions the 
conventional and nuclear balance (National …, 2017: 8), while Estonia and Latvia also 
emphasize their interest in retaining the nuclear forces’ current placement in Europe, 
and maintenance of the nuclear-conventional balance (Eesti …, 2017: 11-12; The 
National …, 2016: 8). NATO also seeks for Allies’ broadest possible participation in 
planning of nuclear roles, however this aim not a focus point in any of the countries’ 
objectives. With the abovementioned notion of Estonia and Latvia about maintaining 
nuclear forces in Europe, they display some interest in nuclear planning. Norway has 
stated that it does not allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on Norwegian territory or 
foreign military vessels with nuclear weapons on board to call in Norwegian ports in 
peacetime (Setting …, 2017: 31). Other than these statements, the interest to take part in 
ensuring, basing and planning the nuclear forces in the Nordic-Baltic area seems 
notably low. 
 Another objective of NATO regarding nuclear power is aiming to further 
develop the capacity to defend against nuclear, but also chemical, biological and 
radiological weapons of mass destruction. This aim is supported by Sweden 
(Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 75) and Norway (Kampkraft …, 2016: 50), the latter also 
providing a number of efforts that have already been or will be made to contribute to 
these developments, such as agreements, investigations and working groups. Similarly, 
NATO has proposed a goal to develop the capability to defend the Allies’ populations 
and territories against ballistic missile attack. In this objective, cooperation is sought 
with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners. As Latvia (The National …, 2016: 8) and 
Finland (Government’s …, 2017: 10) mention the importance of this aim on 
international level, the other three Nordic nations aim to contribute more. While 
Sweden aims to develop their own long range precision combat ability (Försvarspolitisk 
…, 2015: 8) and Norway notes that their “work on identifying possible Norwegian 
contributions to NATO's missile defence continues” (Kampkraft …, 2016: 34), 
Denmark (Defence …, 2018: 5) has within the NATO Wales Summit declaration in 
2014 taken the responsibility to contribute to the Alliance’s defence efforts against 
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ballistic missiles with a sensor capacity. In addition, further studies are in progress to 
identify alternative, flexible options, such as a land-based contribution, and furthermore, 
an investigation of potential future acquirement of long-range precision guided missiles 
is planned. Such patterns within the two specific capacity development objectives can in 
part be substantiated with the countries’ capabilities, both in military means and 
research wise. The Baltics as small countries with small defence forces cannot afford 
contributing largely to building such capacities on national level, whereas the Nordic 
countries have better opportunities and resources to do this. Notably, both Norway’s 
and Denmark’s capacity development plans are immediately connected to NATO’s 
overall implementations in the regard.  
 In terms of capabilities of conventional defence forces, NATO’s strategy 
outlines two points. First, it stresses development and maintenance of “robust, mobile 
and deployable” (Strategic …, 2010: 15) conventional forces that could be used for both 
responsibilities deriving from Article 5, as well as for carrying out expeditionary 
operations; and in addition, it commits to maintaining the ability to sustain several 
concurrent operations. Development of national armed forces’ conventional capabilities 
makes up a remarkable part of the security documents in general and is strongly 
represented in all of the countries’ strategies. The level of precision in the aims 
presented, however, varies a lot between countries, as the strategic documents differ in 
their volume and character. Therefore it is not reasonable to go into more detailed 
comparison on how the countries plan to achieve the mentioned robustness, mobility 
and deployability, but rather whether they aim to do so at all. It could be said that in this 
objective, there is a uniform consensus between the countries, as all put remarkable 
priority on aiming the mentioned qualities within their armed forces. For example, 
Norway states that the Government will ensure that the defence forces are robust and 
flexible (Kampkraft …, 2016: 7), Finland sets forth that the demanding operating 
environment requires “an effective and rapidly deployable military capability” to inter 
alia ensure stability in the Baltic Sea region (Government’s …, 2017: 14), and 
Lithuania claims that only “modern, motivated, well-trained and educated armed forces, 
consisting of manoeuvrable, easily deployable and sustainable regular military units” 
could provide defence of the country (The Military …, 2016: 8-9). Regarding the 
second point, ability to sustain concurrent operations, joint efforts on the other hand are 
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low. The only country that clearly states an aligning task in its strategy is Norway, 
demanding that the Norwegian armed forces would able to at the same time devote 
independent force contributions to up to three operations or three geographically 
separated operating areas (Kampkraft …, 2016: 25). Denmark does not make such 
commitment, but notes that a brigade’s composite units should also be individually 
deployable for participating more in international missions (Defence …, 2018: 3). 
 Further on, NATO has said it would “carry out the necessary training, exercises, 
contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the 
full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate 
visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies” (Strategic …, 2010: 15). As the 
objective is quite broad and comprehensive, yet very relative at the same time, there are 
also many ways countries can correspond to this goal on national level. More or less 
aligning content can be found in all states’ concepts and the variations lie mostly in the 
extent to which they describe the goals regarding exercises, contingency planning, etc. 
A partly coinciding aim in NATO’s strategy is to maintain deterring and defending 
against full range of threats even in the changing security environment by continuing to 
review the overall posture of the Alliance. Looking at the goal on national level, most 
countries also see this as a necessary point in their concepts and are expressing their 
concerns regarding their ability to keep up with the full range of threats., e.g. Finland 
states that besides traditional military threats, it is also preparing to respond to 
“increasingly complex challenges which amalgamate both military and non-military 
means” (Government’s …, 2017: 15-16), and adds that respective implementation will 
go hand in hand with the concept of comprehensive security, and will include reviewing 
legislation. Distinctively from others, the aspect is not handled in concepts of Estonia 
and Lithuania. Another technology-related aim of NATO within the defence and 
deterrence core task is keeping step with emerging technologies and assessing their 
security impact, and furthermore taking potential threats of these into account when 
conducting military planning. To this aim, the Nordic and Baltic countries relate almost 
homogeneously. The only country that has not included an analogous objective in its 
strategy is Denmark. Majority of the concepts state the objective as a general statement, 
e.g. Lithuania states that the country must be prepared to address the new risk factors, 
dangers and threats that emerge in the security environment in order to protect its 
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national interests (National …, 2017: 16), and Sweden emphasizes the importance of 
research and development in understanding the future challenges, threats and 
developments, including the opponents' strengths and weaknesses, and ability to adapt 
military defence to these (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 102). Norway and Estonia go into 
greater detail, elaborating also on what some of the future challenges might be, and list, 
for example, precision-controlled long-range missiles, ammunition and rocket engines, 
unmanned and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, genetics, bio- and 
nanotechnological applications, and the increasing ability to use solar energy and 
magnetic fusion energy (Eesti …, 2017: 20-21; Kampkraft …, 2016: 35). 
  In order to deal with a new security issue that is already widely in use, NATO 
aims to further develop its ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from 
cyber attacks. In this matter, all seven countries stand in strong unity with NATO. Each 
state’s strategic documentation presents long paragraphs with rather specific goals 
within cyber sphere that they aim to accomplish in order to advance the country’s cyber 
defence capabilities. Several countries mention specialized cyber security strategies or 
policies, which had recently been developed or were in progress during adoptions of the 
security concepts: Sweden adopted its information- and cyber security strategy in 2015 
(Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 111), Norway planned to launch an international strategy for 
cyberspace in spring 2017 (Setting …, 2017: 42), the same applies for Denmark 
(Foreign …, 2017: 16), and Latvia has adopted several cyber and information security 
policy documents (The National …, 2015: 27); Finland further notes that in accordance 
with the national Cyber Security Strategy, its defence forces’ cyber defence capability 
development will be continued (Government’s …, 2017: 25). These notions imply that 
cyber security has acquired an important role amongst more traditional sectors of 
security. Sweden, Estonia and Norway stand out with their strategies for the cyber 
security aspect being more integrated into the whole range of security – cyber aspects 
have been included also in development of conventional armed forces, crisis 
management capabilities, etc. instead of the cyber sphere being treated as a separate or 
detached entity of security. This could presumably reflect the situation in ‘off paper’ 
security as well and indicate higher integration of digital and cyber means into other 
security sectors and structures.  
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 As discussed earlier, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, NATO has paid 
significant attention to global fight against terrorism. In the strategic concept, this 
aspiration is represented with an aim to enhance the Alliance’s capabilities to detect and 
defend against international terrorism. As some of the prospective measures, the 
concept lists improved analysis of the terrorist threat, consultations with partners, and 
development of appropriate military capabilities. Similarly to cyber threats, this aim is 
represented in all of the seven Nordic and Baltic countries’ security concepts and all 
intend to contribute to international efforts against terrorism, mainly through NATO and 
the European Union. However, two countries – Denmark and Norway – stand out with 
the extent and precision of their planned efforts, which are remarkably higher and more 
comprehensive compared to the other five. Norway emphasises the importance joint 
efforts and concrete actions in cooperation with the EU, Europol, within the European 
Arrest Warrant, Prüm convention, and other international structures, aiming to deepen 
cross-border cooperation (Setting …, 2017: 26). Denmark, on the other hand, is focused 
on dealing with the ‘roots’ of terrorism and radicalisation in the Middle East and North 
Africa. The efforts are organised through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund and 
bilateral partnership programmes, and aim to tackle key security issues and challenges 
of the region, which “directly or indirectly impact stability, irregular migration flows, 
violent extremism and the maritime security of Denmark and Europe” (Foreign …, 
2017: 12). Denmark also points out its contributions to the military campaign against 
Da’esh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, 
which fulfill the task “of putting military pressure on the terrorist movements”. (Foreign 
…, 2017: 11-12) Such pattern of counter-terrorism efforts is an interesting 
development. Some aligning lines could be drawn to the countries’ experiences with 
terrorist attacks and violent radicalism on their own territory, as both Norway and 
Denmark had within a few years preceding the adoption of current strategies been sites 
of violent acts of radicalism themselves – Norway in 2011 during the attacks of Anders 
Breivik, and Denmark in 2015 during shootings in Copenhagen. This suggestion does 
not, however, explain the pattern in whole, because the Danish Peace and Stabilisation 
Fund was created and developed as a part of 2010-2014 Danish Defence Agreement. 
All in all, the countries’ alignment with the Alliance’s intentions in this matter is 
collective. 
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 Furthermore, proceeding with the non-traditional security issues, NATO aims to 
develop its capacity to contribute to energy security. The Alliance is working towards, 
among other objectives, the ability to protect critical energy infrastructure, transit areas 
and lines, and emphasises cooperation with partners and consultations among NATO 
members in this matter. As could have easily been predicted, here the boundary line of 
alignment with NATO runs between the Baltic and Nordic countries. Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania with their highly dependent energy sectors have outlined strategic plans 
to deal with the issue, whereas Sweden and Denmark do not mention any energy 
concerns. Finland briefly acknowledges existence of such problem (Government …, 
2016: 18) and Norway plans contributions to energy security, but in a fundamentally 
different way compared to the Baltics – Norway aims to provide bilateral assistance to 
Ukraine, and among other means, intends to contribute to reforming the Ukrainian 
energy sector and increasing energy efficiency in Ukraine (Setting …, 2017: 27). 
 Lastly, NATO also touches upon the issue of resources and sets a goal to sustain 
the levels of defence spending necessary for keeping the armed forces sufficiently 
resourced. Meeting the national goal levels of defence spending (2% of the GDP) and 
the share of defence investments in it (20% of overall defence spending) as well as 
burden-sharing between Allies in general has been an issue for longer, and has become 
a widely discussed issue especially after President Trump took office in the US. The 
necessity to meet the 2% national goal was also reinforced during the Wales summit in 
2014. In the national security concepts, all countries aim to increase overall defence 
spending, while all of the NATO member states also mention the importance of meeting 
the 2% goal set by the Alliance. Some set specific goals for that such as Latvia and 
Lithuania, both planning to meet increase their contributions to 2% of GDP by 2018 
(National …, 2017: 8; The National …, 2016: 15;), and Norway, who aims to reach the 
2% line within a decade (Setting …, 2017: 31), while Denmark simply recognizes the 
importance of meeting the goal amount (Foreign …, 2017: 14). The only country 
among the five NATO members, who has already crossed the 2% line and aims on 
sustaining the share of contributions is Estonia (Eesti …, 2017: 11). Both partner 
countries, Sweden and Finland, refrain from presenting their defence expenditure as a 
share of GDP, but outline significant increase plans for their defence budgets 
(Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 9-10; Government’s …, 2017: 31). 
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3.3. Crisis Management 
 
 As its second core task, NATO presents crisis management. To explain the 
nature of the task, the strategic concept states the following: “NATO has a unique and 
robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – 
before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of 
those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the 
potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing 
conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-
conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.” (Strategic …, 2010: 
7-8) Therefore, the centre of the goal is to manage emerging and on-going conflicts and 
crises elsewhere in order to prevent them from growing and hence becoming a threat to 
the Alliance’s security. 
 To start with, NATO sets its aims on preventing and managing crises, and 
supporting post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction beyond its borders “where 
possible and when necessary” (Strategic …, 2010: 19). Similar objectives are 
represented in all the seven countries’ documentation, however some differences can be 
noted. For most country cases (in particular Estonia, Lithuania, Finland and Norway), 
the emphasis is on crisis prevention and pre-emptive work, whereas Denmark has set its 
focus on stabilisation efforts in “key conflicts and security challenges that directly or 
indirectly impact stability, irregular migration flows, violent extremism and the 
maritime security of Denmark and Europe” (Foreign …, 2017: 12). All countries except 
for Denmark and Finland stress the cooperative nature of crisis management efforts and 
NATO’s role and importance in their contributions, while Finland mentions 
development of crisis management within EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
instead (Government …, 2016: 21). Therefore, Denmark is a diverging case in two 
aspects. To some extent, Danish stabilisation efforts seem to go hand in hand with its 
counterterrorism work through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund, which may have 
directed such focus. Denmark’s policy aims also mention another framework, the 
Danish Arab Partnership Programme, but do not specify any other crisis management 
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cooperation or international effort – and is therefore also skipping NATO’s next aim, 
engagement with other international actors before, during and after crises to maximise 
coherence and effectiveness. Similarly, Latvia does not mention any such intention. 
Other states do note the need to do so – Estonia, Lithuania and Finland remaining rather 
laconic, and Norway and Sweden going into greater detail by also naming the main 
partners and explaining their reasoning behind the international engagement efforts. 
This tendency could be in part related to the countries’ experience and history of 
engagement in development cooperation or other international cooperation projects, yet 
has to be connected to other variables as Denmark and Finland, which similarly have 
significant traditions of international development contribution, have chosen not to 
emphasise international engagement as much or at all in crisis management. 
 Going more into detail with the crisis prevention stage, NATO aims to be 
continually monitoring and analysing international environment in order to anticipate 
crises and take preventive steps if appropriate. This goal is represented in three Nordic 
countries’ strategy documents: in those of Finland, Sweden, and Norway. While the 
first two seem to be mainly interested in doing so to keep their own surroundings safe – 
with Finland clearly stating the preventive actions being “for the sake of its security” 
(Government …, 2016: 14) and Sweden aiming to protect “Swedish, Nordic, and 
European security” (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 7) – Norway targets its intentions more 
widely, by not mentioning any specific geographic aims, but emphasising its resources, 
experience in peace and reconciliation diplomacy, and aim to strengthen relevant 
abilities of the United Nations and the African Union instead (Setting …, 2017: 37). 
Moving on to the aim of preparedness and capability to manage on-going hostilities by 
NATO, the involvement of states is significantly higher. Each of the seven countries 
aims to be ready to participate in international operations of crisis management with its 
forces, and to develop the forces accordingly to be competent for such contributions. By 
and large, the national intentions are similar in this regard. As a point of interest, it shall 
be noted that unlike others, Lithuania specifically emphasises contributing to the 
strength of NATO crisis management capabilities (National …, 2017: 9), and  Norway 
indicates UN and NATO as the most important actors, while also noting the need to be 
able to contribute to EU and coalition operations (Kampkraft …, 2016: 25). Thirdly, 
NATO sets as its goal to be prepared to and capable of contributing to post-conflict 
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stabilisation and reconstruction. As could be expected based on the previously discussed 
points, Denmark is a strong promoter of stabilisation efforts. It emphasises the necessity 
to further develop the Danish Defence Forces’ ability to stabilise the areas of their 
deployment and carry out capacity building, and aims to nearly double the Ministry of 
Defence's financial contribution to these efforts by 2023. (Defence …, 2018: 5) 
However, Denmark is not the only one supporting the aim of NATO. While Estonia, 
Lithuania, Finland and Sweden indicate the necessity of post-conflict stabilisation and 
reconstruction efforts, and emphasise their readiness to contribute to these, Norway has 
more detailed plans. It targets its contributions to fragile states, in particular in Middle 
East, North Africa and Sahel region, increasing support and aid targeted to the states in 
need, and creating greater presence in the region by opening new embassies in Mali and 
Tunisia (Setting …, 2017: 38). Norway does not indicate NATO’s role in carrying out 
these stabilisation efforts. 
 Furthermore, NATO intends to enhance intelligence sharing within the Alliance 
in order to develop its ability to predict and prevent crises. Similar goals have been set 
by Norway, Estonia and Latvia. While Estonia aims to contribute to information 
exchange “with partners” (Eesti …, 2017: 14), Latvia and Norway particularly stress 
doing so within NATO (The National …, 2016: 6; Setting …, 2017: 31). Sweden and 
Finland’s refrainment from this goal can be explained simply with the fact that the 
clause “within the Alliance” already excludes them, as they are only partner states of 
NATO. Lithuania and Denmark, on the other hand, have not included this as a goal on 
national level despite being members of NATO. Similar pattern can be identified 
regarding another aim of NATO, namely broadening and intensifying political 
consultations among allies and with partners on a regular basis and in dealing with all 
stages of a crisis. Neither Lithuania nor Denmark sees this as a national strategic aim, 
with the same applying for Latvia. Estonia and Norway emphasise the importance of 
dialogue in crisis prevention (Eesti …, 2017: 14; Setting …, 2017: 31-32), and both 
Sweden and Finland point out the importance of consultation and dialogue in their 
partnerships with NATO (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 38; Government …, 2016: 24). 
 Lastly, NATO has included five more specific objectives of capability building 
in the crisis management core task, which include both military and civilian aims. To 
start with, NATO aims to further develop doctrine and military capabilities for 
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expeditionary operations. Whereas the need of developing military capabilities in 
general was not left out by any of the states, only two intend to do so also while keeping 
an eye on suitability for expeditionary operations – Denmark and Norway. The former 
claims it wishes to strengthen “The Armed Forces’ ability and capacity for international 
operations and international stabilisation efforts” (Defence …, 2018: 2), and the latter 
notes that its Armed Forces must have strong capabilities for international operations 
available for deployment at short notice, and furthermore have sufficient stamina to 
stand together with allies and partners in an operational area over time (Kampkraft …, 
2016: 24). The second aim related to military capabilities is to establish necessary 
capability for training and developing local forces in crisis zones. Similarly to the 
previous one, it is not widely shared by the countries, but is represented in the national 
documentation. Finland emphasises the importance of training activities and security 
sector reforms (Government …, 2016: 28) and Denmark of capacity building (Foreign 
…, 2017: 12), whereas Lithuania also adds a geographical factor, noting its focus in 
such actions to be on Eastern neighbourhood (The Military …, 2016: 8). From the 
civilian side, NATO intends to, firstly, form a civilian crisis management capability to 
interface more effectively with civilian partners, and secondly, to identify and train 
civilian specialists for rapid deployment for selected missions. Both find very little 
representation in the national strategies, with Finland and Sweden briefly mentioning 
the former, of which Sweden does so in the context of the EU (Försvarspolitisk …, 
2015: 35; Government …, 2016: 27-28), and no country dealing with the latter. Finally, 
the Alliance aims for enhancement of integrated civilian-military planning throughout 
the whole crisis spectrum. Contrary to the civilian-related objectives, the countries in 
question mostly find civilian-military integration important and aim to further develop 
it. The Baltics, Norway and Sweden all essentially intend to strengthen interoperability 
between the two, and profit from their common efficiency this way. Finland and 
Denmark do not note having such aims in their strategic documents. 
 
 
 
 
 49 
3.4. Promoting International Security Through Cooperation 
 
 NATO’s third and final core task is to promote international security through 
cooperation. The task has three subsections, which represent the central means of 
practising cooperative security: 1) arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; 2) 
open door; and 3) partnerships. The strategic concept summarizes the task as follows: 
“The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond 
its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through 
partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by 
contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by 
keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that 
meet NATO’s standards.” (Strategic …, 2010: 8) Important aspects of the task are 
taking aim at achieving security with the lowest possible level of forces and 
recommitting to enlargement of the Alliance. As partners, NATO considers non-NATO 
countries, international organisations, and other international actors. (NATO, 2017) 
 The objectives of the core task begin with the general aim to reinforce arms 
control, promote of disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction, and non-proliferation. This aim is mostly also represented in the national 
strategies, however comes with two countries that have not mentioned this goal – 
Denmark and Sweden. The same pattern for these two further continues regarding all 
points that fall under the arms control subsection. While both have generally been 
supporters and participants of disarmament and non-proliferation actions through recent 
history, e.g. both have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT), there is no reason to infer that Denmark and Sweden are in 
principle against arms control efforts; however, the topic is not represented in their 
security and defence strategies. Apart from these two, all countries claim working 
towards disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation to be their security aim and a 
part of the international effort towards a more secure world. Next, NATO moves further 
to intentions related to nuclear weapons. Essentially, the Alliance seeks to create a safer 
world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the NPT. All of the countries 
discussed have adopted the NPT themselves, yet only few of them mention working 
towards such goal in their national strategies – Finland and Norway. Finland states that 
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it supports NPT in nuclear disarmament (Government …, 2016: 29), and Norway 
claims to have adopted a parliament decision in 2016 to “work actively towards the goal 
of a world free of nuclear weapons and to promote the implementation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)” (Setting …, 2017: 35). None of the Baltic states has 
endorsed such aim in their strategic documentation. With its next goal, NATO plans to 
further reduce the amount of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. This objective finds 
no support on national strategic level in the Nordic-Baltic countries. On the contrary, 
Estonia even takes a statement somewhat against it, declaring that the part of NATO’s 
nuclear deterrence in Europe must be preserved and maintained as credible, due to it 
being the ultimate guarantee of the Alliance’s security (Eesti …, 2017: 11-12). As the 
smallest of the countries in question and therefore possibly most exposed to security 
threats, this statement displays how important Estonia considers NATO’s deterrence 
capabilities in its safe-being. Furthermore, NATO intends to seek Russian agreement in 
increasing transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe, and in relocating these away 
from the borders Russia shares with NATO members. Lithuania’s strategy similarly sets 
its aim on seeking increased transparency and regulation regarding Russia’s nuclear 
weapons (National …, 2017: 11), which is reasonably argued with Lithuania’s specific 
geographical position next to Russia’s enclave of Kaliningrad. The enclave has high 
importance in the Baltic and particularly Lithuanian security, as Russia has been using 
the region to increase its military presence in Europe, and does so by gathering shares of 
its armed forces on a small territory very close to Lithuania. Latvia and Estonia, 
however, refrain from aspiring towards such agreement with Russia. Additionally, 
Norway notes the Alliance’s said aim and states this to be “demanding” in today’s 
security situation (Kampkraft …, 2016: 32), while Finland takes no statement on the 
topic.  
Furthermore, NATO introduces three objectives related to disarmament and 
non-proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. As 
first of these, the Alliance aims to establish a stronger conventional arms regime in 
Europe. Lithuania and Norway are the only ones that point this goal out in their national 
strategies and aim to participate in such efforts, with Norway also specifying it hopes to 
do so via the OSCE (National …, 2017: 11; Setting …, 2017: 35). Next, NATO intends 
to contribute to international proliferation efforts, by both political and military means. 
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This seems to be a more or less common interest in the Nordic-Baltic area as well, with 
Latvia being the only one (besides the aforementioned Sweden and Denmark) that has 
not specified contributing to proliferation as an aim of its national security policy. 
Finally, the Alliance aims at maintenance and development of consultations on national 
decisions regarding arms control and disarmament among the Allies. With the said 
objective’s complicated applicability on national level, it is not exactly represented in 
any of the national policies. However, in a way, Norway does set a similar goal, but not 
regarding the NATO Allies – instead, it aims to strengthen and use its expertise and 
capabilities of further assisting other countries with the practical implementation of 
disarmament agreements, as it has done in Iran and Syria in the past (Setting …, 2017: 
34-35). 
 As the second part of this core task, NATO sets objectives regarding its open 
door policy. To begin with, the concept says that the “goal of a Europe whole and free, 
and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all 
European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures” (Strategic …, 2010: 25). 
In general, the Nordic-Baltic countries that themselves are part of NATO rather support 
the enlargement of the Alliance and further integration of European countries into Euro-
Atlantic structures. A claim supporting such developments is included in all the Baltic 
countries’ and Norway’s strategies, therefore leaving only Denmark of NATO member 
states to not mention said interest. However, the difference between the countries is that 
while Latvia and Lithuania claim to support European or Euro-Atlantic integration 
(National …, 2017: 10; The National …, 2016: 10), Estonia specifies its support to 
NATO and the EU (Eesti …, 2017: 10), and Norway only mentions the European Union 
(Setting …, 2017: 27). Neither of the partner states of NATO, Finland and Sweden, 
have set this goal in their documents, which is only reasonable as they have not decided 
to join the Alliance themselves. However, as NATO next claims that its door remains 
open to “all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are 
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and 
whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability” (Strategic …, 2010: 
25-26), this pattern changes a bit. While the newer members of NATO, the Baltics, are 
well eager to welcome new members into the Alliance and declare to support and assist 
the countries in their aspirations to join NATO (Eesti …, 2017: 10; National …, 2017: 
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9-10; The National …, 2016: 10), the older members, Denmark and Norway, refrain 
from making such statements. While Sweden still presents no opinion on the matter, 
Finland states that it is “important to Finland” that NATO maintains its open door 
policy and the membership remains continuously open to all European countries with 
necessary “capacity and qualifications to advance the goals of the North Atlantic 
Treaty” (Government …, 2016: 23). Whether this is due to Finland’s future plan to join 
the Alliance itself remains a question of speculation. 
 Lastly, NATO’s strategic concept sets aims about partnerships. As the primary 
goal in this subsection, the Alliance seeks to promote Euro-Atlantic security “through a 
wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the 
globe” (Strategic …, 2010: 26). Looking through the national strategies regarding 
security promotion through partnerships, similar ideas are presented by the Baltics, 
Finland and Norway, while Denmark and Sweden have not included such aim in their 
documentation. Minor differences exist, e.g. Norway clearly states its closest 
partnerships will remain within the Atlantic, European and Nordic communities (Setting 
…, 2017: 5), while Estonia remains broader with circumscribing its interests, saying it 
prefers “international and comprehensive multilateral cooperation, both at the global 
and regional level” (Eesti …, 2017: 8). Finland, remarkably, makes an additional notion 
with the claim, stating that international defence cooperation does not provide any 
security guarantees for Finland as it does not belong to any military alliance 
(Government’s …, 2017: 16). NATO also works towards relationships of dialogue and 
cooperation with partners, which are built on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual 
respect. Much the same values in partnerships are emphasised by Norway and Sweden. 
Norway’s strategy states its cooperation would rely on “thorough analyses and early 
dialogue with relevant partners” (Kampkraft …, 2016: 20). In the case of Sweden, the 
objective is presented directly regarding its partnership with NATO, indicating that the 
Swedish-NATO relationship is based on common interests and needs (Försvarspolitisk 
…, 2015: 38). Next, NATO sets an aim to enhance partnerships through flexible 
formats, which is an idea also found in the strategies of Estonia, Lithuania, Denmark 
and Sweden. While Swedish idea of such partnerships is rather with regard to military 
aspects and abilities to give and receive military assistance (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 
50), the other three have presented broader views of flexible approaches. Perhaps the 
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most interesting perspective is presented by Denmark, which states that “[i]n the light of 
Brexit, the government will actively expand its cooperation with traditional partners and 
seek new alliance partners that share interests and values with Denmark” (Foreign …, 
2017: 19), however this statement is likely more linked to foreign policy strategy rather 
than security and defence.  
Thereupon, NATO introduces two objectives related to openness: firstly, to be 
“prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and 
relevant organisations that share our interest in peaceful international relations” 
(Strategic …, 2010: 26-27), and secondly, to be “open to consultation with any partner 
country on security issues of common concern” (Strategic …, 2010: 27). Out of the 
seven countries, Estonia is the only one to indicate a viewpoint compatible with both 
ideas, claiming that along with extensive cooperation with all Allies, partnerships with 
like-minded democracies form an integral part of Estonian security (Eesti …, 2017: 10). 
Furthermore, NATO sets an aim to give its operational partners a structural, strategy- 
and decision-shaping role on NATO-led missions to which they contribute, which 
however finds no representation in the national strategies of the Nordic-Baltic countries 
at all. This could be considered quite predictable, as the central idea of the goal is 
strongly linked to NATO as an institution, and much less to its member and partner 
states on national level. On the contrary, as NATO next indicates a goal to further 
develop its existing partnerships, all seven states also relate to it in national strategies. 
The main partnership interests in the region are stronger relations with partner states 
within NATO and EU, transatlantic link with the United States, development of the 
Baltic Sea region states’ and Nordic-Baltic cooperation, as well as Nordic and Baltic 
states’ relations as separate groups. The statements on regional cooperation will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this thesis. Other partner countries indicated in the 
national strategies include Poland, United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
the EU Eastern Partnership countries, and under some special conditions, Russia. 
Regarding relationships with international organisations, NATO’s strategic concept 
mentions two partners: the United Nations and The European Union. With the former, 
NATO’s desire is to enhance political dialogue and practical cooperation; with the 
latter, in addition, to develop stronger strategic partnership and more full cooperation in 
capability development, and this way minimising duplication and maximising cost-
 54 
effectiveness, has been set as aspirations. Regarding the strategic views about the UN 
and the EU, the Nordic-Baltic states are nearly unanimous both between each other and 
with NATO. About the UN, all countries’ strategies except for Lithuania touch upon the 
importance of the organisation and its functions, emphasising their support to UN 
initiatives (Setting …, 2017: 32) and involvement in them (Defence …, 2018: 2; The 
National …, 2015: 2), and aiming towards active contribution to UN’s effectiveness 
(Eesti …, 2017: 8; Government …, 2016: 29). Sweden is the only country elaborating a 
bit more on how to do that, and suggests increased participation in operations, 
contributions to capacity and concept development, and education support within the 
UN framework as possible actions (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 35). Regarding the EU, 
the seven states’ strategies represent largely similar intentions, both in terms of national 
enhancement of security-related cooperation with the EU and strengthening the EU as 
an actor in the security field in general, as well as of deepening NATO-EU partnership. 
In this case, there is no country, which would not mention the said aim. Although 
Norway is not itself a member of the EU, the Norwegian strategy claims the EU to be a 
key partner of Norway in defence and security matters (Kampkraft …, 2016: 33). Even 
Denmark, known as the country that has opted out from the EU’s defence sphere, states 
it plans to “closely follow” the new initiatives within the EU’s defence dimension 
(Defence …, 2018: 2). Countries also find the strength of the European Union a crucial 
component of their national and European security (e.g. Foreign …, 2017:17; 
Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 46). Furthermore, the political dialogue, cooperation and 
coordination of actions between the EU and NATO is prioritized (e.g. Defence …, 
2018: 2; Eesti …, 2017: 9; Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 35-36; Kampkraft …, 2016: 33). 
Therefore, regarding partnerships with other international organisations, the Nordic-
Baltic countries’ and NATO’s viewpoints and objectives are somewhat consistent.  
Yet, this consistency does not stand regarding the next aim presented by NATO 
– a strategic partnership with Russia. The unanimity persists between the states, 
however, as none of them has included such objective in their strategic documentation. 
The discrepancy between NATO and the states can, evidently, originate from the 
difference in the time of writing the strategies – as the NATO strategic concept was 
adopted in 2010, the Ukrainian events of 2014, which reshaped the Western relations 
with Russia significantly and have probably had considerable influence on the national 
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strategies as well, had not yet taken place. Therefore also the next goal of the NATO 
concept, enhancement of political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia 
through NATO-Russia Council, finds rather modest representation in the Nordic-Baltic 
national documents. Among the Baltics, Estonia is the only one to note it cooperate with 
Russia as much as necessary as a neighbouring country, and maintains the opportunity 
for dialogue (Eesti …, 2017: 9-10). The Nordics are more eager to work towards better 
relations with Russia with all countries but Sweden having included similar points in 
their strategies. Finland aims to maintain a “stable and well-functioning” relationship 
with Russia, promoting cooperation and dialogue, yet following the EU’s common 
positions on Russia as a basis of its actions (Government …, 2016: 22-23). Similarly, 
Denmark presents a position of seeking dialogue and common understanding with 
Russia, while not making any concessions regarding the sanctions in place (Foreign …, 
2017: 14-15). Norwegian focus in this question is on the Northern and Arctic maritime 
areas and on avoiding misunderstandings regarding trainings and exercises as well as 
openness and predictability of military activity (Kampkraft …, 2016: 29). At least in the 
case of Nordic countries, geographic factors seem to have had direct influence on 
formulation of said positions, however they are in general more eager to improve 
relations with Russia and hence more closely in line with the strategic position of 
NATO.  
Moving on to its neighbouring areas in the south from Europe, NATO sets goals 
regarding relations and cooperation with countries of the Mediterranean and the Gulf 
region, and aims to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative. Perhaps due to the long distance between these two regions and Nordic-Baltic 
countries, none of the seven countries in question have included said aims in their 
national objectives. The same pattern continues regarding the next goal of NATO, 
which aims towards enhancement of consultations and practical military cooperation 
with partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. As its penultimate objective, 
NATO intends to continue and develop its partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia, 
doing so within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia commissions. Four countries – 
Lithuania, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, present support to this aim. Sweden remains 
brief with stating its government’s support to Ukraine (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 46), 
while the remaining three have aimed to contribute to improvements of both Ukraine 
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and Georgia as well as of their relations with and integration to the Euro-Atlantic 
community. Denmark plans to provide support via its five-year neighbourhood 
programme for Ukraine and Georgia, the Norwegian government is dedicating its 
economic and political support to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and Lithuania aims to 
support integration aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia and several other EU Eastern 
Partnership countries alike. All three further emphasise the importance of such efforts in 
terms of overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. (Foreign …, 2017: 15; National …, 
2017: 10; The Military …, 2016: 6; Setting …, 2017: 27) Lastly, NATO aims to 
facilitate the Western Balkans integration to the Euro-Atlantic community, and this goal 
is also presented in the strategic concept of Norway. Norway intends to double its 
assistance in order to support the reform programmes of the Western Balkan countries, 
hence speeding up their integration into the EU and NATO. The strategy further 
mentions continuing Norway’s “long-standing cooperation on defence and defence 
reform” with the Western Balkans, giving a hint of the role of tradition and path 
dependency in this strategic choice. (Setting …, 2017: 27) 
 
3.5. Discussion 
 
 At this point, the viewpoints of the operative strategic concept of NATO and 
national strategic concepts of the Nordic-Baltic countries regarding the three core tasks 
have been compared and concurrences between the documents determined. In order to 
better understand the main trends and patterns as well as the overall big picture, the 
results of the preceding examinations will be further discussed below. This will be done 
in four parts: the first three following the structure of the previous subchapter in core 
tasks of NATO, and the last one drawing overall conclusions based on the patterns 
developed within core tasks. 
 Within its first core task, defence and deterrence, NATO presents 16 separate 
aims and intentions related to actions against an armed attack towards the Alliance. On 
the whole, all seven Nordic-Baltic countries are rather supportive than not towards these 
intentions, having analogous goals set on national strategic level as well – for at last half 
of the aims, an upholding goal has been introduced on national level by all the states. 
The greatest number of such goals, 13 aims out of 16, were included in cases of Latvia 
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and Norway, and the least number, 9 out of 16, appeared in the documentation of 
Sweden and Denmark. However, as the aims within this core task as well as in the 
forthcoming ones are not necessarily equal to each other regarding level of 
specification, extent, priority and relevance, and other such variables, these numbers 
cannot be taken as fully objective and comparable measures for quantitative analysis in 
terms of this thesis, and looking for patterns and explanations behind these patterns 
would be more useful in understanding the countries’ perceptions.  
Firstly, there are goals, which are commonly shared by all actors, i.e. by NATO 
and all the countries on both the Alliance and national levels. Such aims are protection 
and defence of territory and populations against attack, development and maintenance 
of robust and deployable conventional forces, carrying out trainings, planning and 
information exchange necessary for defending against the full range of security 
challenges, keeping up with emerging technologies as well as assessing their security 
impact and taking it into account in military planning, handling and protecting against 
cyber attacks, and detecting and defending against international terrorism. On one hand, 
several of these goals are rather general and form the very basics of the security of an 
entity, which makes it reasonable to be able find these on all of the countries’ aims in 
some form, but also includes a level of vagueness. The aims are general enough for each 
country to be able to adapt them for their own national cases according to the state’s 
needs and available resources. On the other hand, the goals well demonstrate the most 
essential components of modern security policy regarding defence measures. With e.g. 
international terrorism and cyber attacks being threats that can endanger basically any 
country at any point of time, it is necessary for all to work towards the capacity to tackle 
security issues in these areas. 
The second pattern can be noted regarding aims where the distinction line runs 
between partner states and member states of NATO. This is the case regarding 
deterrence and its key importance as a security guarantee – while all the NATO 
members considered in this thesis see deterrence to be a central instrument of defence, 
the partner countries do not emphasise the role of deterrence notably or at all; and 
regarding levels of defence spending. Yet, this is also the only aim where such pattern 
appears under the first core task. With this one being the only one among the sixteen 
aims, it could be determined that the correlation with the first assumption of the thesis is 
 58 
weak within the first core task of NATO. However, for the case of the NATO member 
countries, the Alliance indeed could be a strong influence for including this objective on 
their national strategic level, as deterrence is the key response of NATO to current 
security challenges. 
Thirdly, differences between Nordic and Baltic countries can be noted. For 
example, this distinction exists regarding maintenance of balance of nuclear and 
conventional forces, where the Baltics are supporters of NATO’s nuclear-conventional 
balance and the Nordics have not set this as an aim. Additionally, energy security is a 
significant security issue for the Baltics, but is rather briefly or not at all dealt with in 
the Nordics’ strategies. Divergences in both objectives can be easily traced back to 
historical reasons, but also rely on geography in part. In regard to the latter aim, the 
Baltic countries concern about energy security roots from both: the Baltics’ energy 
supply relies partly on the Russian energy networks and markets due to historical 
associations, which makes them more vulnerable and extremely sensitive to any issue of 
security. Additionally, compared to the Nordics, the Baltics’ natural conditions and 
resources for producing energy and providing the supply for themselves are weaker, 
growing the Baltics’ reason for concern compared to the Nordics. The former aim is 
more related to historical experience of the Baltics with their eastern neighbour and the 
belief that a nuclear component can offer credible security balance to hinder future 
threats from Russia. Furthermore, there are two aims, which have been included in the 
security strategies by Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and to a lesser extent by Latvia 
and Finland – resulting in nearly unanimous views by the Nordics and, in addition, 
Latvia. Even though these aims do not fully represent the Nordic-Baltic distinction 
pattern, they still display a stronger like-mindedness between the Nordic states. The two 
objectives are defence against ballistic missiles and maintenance of defence and 
deterrence against full range of security threats. While the former aim can be related to 
resources and is more realistic and reachable for the Nordic rather than the Baltic states, 
the second aim is rather general. Based on adoption of these aims, it could be said that 
both Nordics and Baltics as groups of states have somewhat similar extent of 
intersections with NATO objectives, however Latvia shows higher level of concurrence 
compared to others with both groups and the Alliance. 
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Lastly within this core task, no strong pattern can be identified with the 
remaining combinations of states. These include Estonia and Latvia supporting planning 
of nuclear roles, Sweden and Norway aiming to develop defence capabilities against 
nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons of mass destruction, and 
Norway and Denmark working towards the capacity to sustain concurrent operations. 
All three pairs are formed between neighbouring countries and do not cross the Nordic-
Baltic distinction line. Based on the countries and the aims in question, it could be 
concluded that there is some divergence regarding nuclear power, as Estonia and Latvia 
see it mainly as a means of deterrence, whereas Sweden and Norway perceive nuclear 
power as weapon of mass destruction and therefore primarily a threat to security. Again, 
due to their history, Estonia and Latvia have a higher perception of threat in regard to 
Russia, and deterring against any attack from the east based on nuclear power is more 
important to them than for Sweden and Norway, which lack such historical experience 
and see nuclear weapons as a security threat in itself. This, however, does not 
completely explain why the aim does not fall in the pattern of distinction between the 
Nordic and Baltic groups, as the same logic also stands for Lithuania, Finland and 
Denmark. The third objective regarding concurrent operations seems to be going hand 
in hand with NATO membership and availability of the necessary resources, making it 
on the national level difficult to reach for the Baltic countries and of lower priority for 
Sweden and Finland. 
The second core task, crisis management, presents 12 central aims in regard to 
preventing and solving conflicts outside the Alliance’s own territory in order to 
contribute to overall Euro-Atlantic security. Here, the Nordic-Baltic countries’ efforts to 
include NATO’s aims to national strategies have not been as numerous as within the 
first core task. While Norway still shows a high level of inclusiveness with nine 
analogous goals, Latvia’s national strategic documents have only four common aims 
with NATO’s concept. Despite that, there are still some objectives that find 
representation in all countries’ strategies. Firstly, all seven have included the key aim of 
the core task, to prevent and manage crises as well as support post-conflict stabilisation 
and reconstruction processes outside their own and NATO’s territory, in their own 
strategies. All further include the goal to be prepared and capable to manage on-going 
hostilities. Therefore, the common share is formed by the perhaps most central and 
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basic objectives of participating in international crisis management. With all the Nordic-
Baltic states belonging to the Western community by values and economic 
development, such aims are already related to good practice and tradition, even though 
the Nordics have been a part of this tradition for a significantly longer time than the 
Baltics.  
Furthermore, one could assume that the strength of the countries’ tradition of 
participating in such efforts has an effect on adoption of crisis management objectives 
into national strategies as well. However, this distinction cannot be clearly made in case 
of any of the discussed aims. The closest to said pattern could be the intention to 
monitor the international environment for crisis prevention, which can be found in the 
Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian strategies, and can indeed be related to experience that 
the Baltic countries do not yet have. A few other aims are included in two Nordic 
countries’ strategies only: developing military capabilities for expeditionary operations 
(Denmark, Norway), capacity for training local forces in crisis zones (Denmark, 
Finland), and civilian crisis management capabilities (Sweden, Finland). The latter is 
conjointly the only aim that the partner states of NATO have in their strategies while the 
member states do not – providing, again, no support for the first assumption (h1) of the 
thesis. However, it is notable that each of the twelve aims of NATO is also an intention 
of at least one Nordic country. This does not stand true for Baltic countries, neither is 
there any that only the Baltics would support. On one hand, this tendency can be 
connected to the Nordics’ greater experience in the crisis management field, on the 
other to resources – existence of both of which the countries themselves point out in the 
strategies. As the Baltics lack both the long experience and extensive human and 
financial resources to dedicate to conflict management, the extent of their participation 
in crisis management efforts and intentions is more modest compared to the Nordics, 
and the Baltics rather support the objectives related to knowledge, such as intelligence 
sharing or intensifying dialogue and consultations. 
By and large, the trend lines within crisis management aims are rather weak. 
There are intentions that are included in many, but not all countries’ strategies and the 
patterns follow general country group lines, e.g. engagement with international actors 
beforehand regards certain crisis management efforts and further integration of civil-
military planning. However, there is one aim the non-inclusion of which all countries 
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agree on – training civil specialists for rapid deployment to missions. While the aims 
related to civilian capabilities are not popular in national strategies in general, aiming 
towards such specific training on national level is probably not reasonable or cost-
effective for any of the Nordic-Baltic countries. 
The third and last NATO’s core task discussed sets aims about international 
security cooperation. NATO presents 25 key objectives in three topics – arms control, 
the open door policy, and partnerships. Within this core task, concurrences between the 
NATO concept and national strategies are the lowest compared to the previous two, 
with only the country with the highest number of shared aims, Norway, reaching more 
than half of the NATO goals. Other countries share around or less than ten common 
aims with NATO under this core task. The first noteworthy trend, already discussed in 
subchapter 3.5. of the thesis, is that Denmark and Sweden refrain from mentioning any 
aims regarding arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in their national 
strategies, which complicates tracking down the patterns within the subchapter in 
general. However, apart from those two, all countries have set disarmament, arms 
control and non-proliferation as their objectives. Furthermore, all seven claim to work 
towards developing existing partnerships, in particular with the US, European partners 
and regional partners, and enhance cooperation with or within the UN and the EU. 
Additionally, there are several aims that are not represented in any national strategies. 
When looking for trends coinciding with country groups within this core task, 
the results are not numerous. Distinction between member states and partner states of 
NATO can be noted in regard to enlargement of Euro-Atlantic structures to all 
European countries, and the only case where the Nordics (and Estonia) have gathered to 
one side of the view is on developing dialogue with Russia. The three Baltics seem to 
agree to each other more often – regarding enlargement, the open door policy, and 
promoting security through partnerships. Such favourable attitude towards openness can 
be related to their own positive experience with becoming a member of NATO and the 
Euro-Atlantic community in general. All in all, neither does this core task present any 
greater support to the proposed assumption (h1) regarding differences between member 
and partner states. Many aims of this core task are represented in just one or two 
countries’ strategies, giving little ground for drawing other trend lines. Two more 
popular ones are supporting conventional and nuclear non-proliferation efforts and 
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developing partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia, both being found in four countries’ 
national documentation. However, neither clear evident groups nor a reason for the 
formulation of such are present. 
All in all, the Nordic-Baltic countries seem to most eagerly agree with NATO in 
their aims regarding defence and deterrence. As in its functions, NATO is primarily a 
military alliance dedicated to protection of its own territory, and the countries’ defence 
policies’ key aim is also the protection of its territory and population, the aims related to 
defence and deterrence appear most important and relevant for the countries. 
Additionally, the Baltic states seem to be more concerned about deterrence and nuclear 
balance than the Nordic countries, but also emphasise energy security and openness 
towards potential candidate states as well as partners. The Nordic countries, on the other 
hand, direct their emphasis more towards crisis management and security threats with 
global range. These differences can be traced back to different past experiences, 
historical background, and different availability of resources. 
The first empirical assumption of the thesis proposed that the member states of 
NATO have higher strategic intersections with NATO compared to partner states of 
NATO in the Nordic-Baltic area. For this assumption to be proved valid, the 
implications observed in empirical data would be 1) a high degree of common strategic 
aims for relating to the global power strategically, i.e. strategic intersections between 
strategic concept of NATO and national documents; and 2) distinction between 
membership and partnership for identifying with the global power, i.e. closeness to 
NATO regarding whether the country is a member state or a partner state of NATO. 
The first implication can indeed be considered true for the Nordic-Baltic countries, as 
all the seven countries’ national defence and security strategy documents include many 
common aims with NATO’s strategic concept. Around half or more of NATO’s 
objectives are represented in each Nordic-Baltic state’s national defence strategy and 
the national documents largely carry the same ideas as NATO’s concept. This indicates 
a high degree of strategic intersections between the international and national level. 
Therefore, the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex firmly identifies with the main global power 
of the security field in the region. The second implication, however, has found support 
in very few cases throughout the preceding analysis. The distinction between member 
states and partner states does exist regarding a few aims where the relationship with 
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NATO has probably influenced the countries’ viewpoint, e.g. importance of deterrence 
and development of civilian crisis management capabilities. However, these cases are in 
a strong minority within the 53 objectives, and regarding most of the objectives, there is 
no clear separation between the member and non-member states’ views. The extent to 
which NATO’s aims and the national aims of Sweden and Finland concur is also not 
lower as assumed, but rather average within the other Nordic-Baltic countries. 
Therefore, the second implication cannot be observed in empirical data and the first 
empirical assumption (h1) does not appear valid as such. However, distinctive lines 
regarding national aims and intersections with NATO’s strategy could be noted between 
Nordic and Baltic states regarding several topics, where national preferences could be 
traced back to reasons based on past experiences and traditions, historical background, 
and availability of resources. 
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4. PERCEPTIONS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
The following chapter aims to answer the second research question of the thesis 
– what are Nordic and Baltic countries’ regional cooperation interests in the changed 
security environment? In this chapter, the data gathered from national security and 
defence strategy documents regarding Nordic and Baltic countries’ cooperation will be 
analysed comparatively. Firstly, the chapter will present the empirical results found in 
the seven countries’ security concepts. Then, the results will be discussed and analysed 
to determine the countries’ perceptions of a Nordic-Baltic security complex in the post-
2014 security landscape.  
 
 
4.1. Countries’ Aims Regarding Nordic-Baltic Cooperation 
 
 In their national security and defence strategies, all countries further present 
their expectations and plans regarding partnerships with international actors and other 
countries. Regional cooperation forms an important part of it. The section below 
introduces the Nordic and Baltic countries’ interests and aims regarding Nordic-Baltic 
cooperation in the security field. This will be first done in paragraphs by country, and 
the findings will be discussed comparatively in the next subchapter. The country 
paragraphs follow alphabetical order. 
 Denmark presents its first statement regarding regional issues on the topic of 
Russia’s threatening behaviour and its contribution to growing uncertainty in the Baltic 
Sea region. Denmark considers Russia’s “threatening statements, military build-up and 
increased military exercises in the vicinity of Denmark” to be “a clear challenge” for 
Denmark and its allies since Russia’s usage of information and hybrid warfare 
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influences the Baltic Sea region’s stability and the Western values in general. (Foreign 
…, 2017: 7) For managing this issue, Denmark contributes to reassurance activities in 
the Baltic Sea region, and aims to allocate more funds to defence in order to ensure 
credible defence and deterrence within NATO (Foreign …, 2017: 14). For the latter, 
contributions will be made through NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic 
countries. Denmark further presents its historical ties and close relations with the Baltic 
Sea region and the Baltic countries; in addition, the existence of common values shared 
by the NATO countries of the BSR as well as Finland and Sweden. The strategic 
concept sets an aim to continue and develop the cooperation with the Baltic countries, 
and to expand Denmark’s active security policy role through stronger cooperation 
between Nordic countries as well as with other allies in the Baltic Sea Region. It further 
claims to “continue to assign high priority to security policy-related cooperation with 
the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea”. (Foreign …, 2017: 15-16) The Danish 
defence agreement discusses Denmark’s commitment to support and defend the Baltic 
countries together with NATO allies if necessary, and sets aims regarding fulfilling host 
nation support tasks for when Denmark becomes a staging area for reinforcements from 
NATO allies (Defence …, 2018: 7). With a few of the Nordic-Baltic countries, 
Denmark also cooperates within international frameworks of the Arctic area, e.g. the 
Arctic Council, where Denmark intends to enhance economic development through 
close cooperation with Finland (Foreign …, 2017: 24) Finally, Denmark presents an 
objective to, within the Danish Institute of International Studies and the Centre for 
Military Studies, increase research initiatives that relate to the Baltic Sea and the Baltic 
countries (Defence …, 2018: 11). 
 Estonia’s strategic concept gives an assessment that there has been an increase 
of military pressure and of the likelihood that military measures will be used against 
Estonia or another country of the Baltic Sea region. Still, it finds NATO’s military 
superiority to be sufficient against any attack, stating that its presence and activity in the 
region have increased, and additionally the Nordics’ and Baltics’ cooperation has 
intensified. (Eesti …, 2017: 4) Estonia further considers the United States’ military 
presence in the region and NATO allies’ military integration to be important (Eesti …, 
2017: 9). As key aims of regional cooperation, Estonia sets friendly relations with all 
neighbouring states, security assurance of the Baltic Sea region, and enhancement of 
 66 
Nordic and Baltic countries’ cooperation. Estonia’s interests are political dialogue and 
security cooperation regarding defence, energy, environment and transport 
infrastructure. (Eesti …, 2017: 10) Some designated actions for achieving these goals 
are also introduced in the strategy. Such are avoiding sea pollution through development 
of ship management and monitoring systems, improving the security of the Baltic Sea 
region's nuclear plants, and ensuring effective energy transmission links with the 
Baltics, the Nordics and Poland (Eesti …, 2017: 15-18). 
 Finland claims the security of the Baltic Sea region has deteriorated, military 
tensions in the region have grown, and the Baltic Sea region’s military-strategic 
importance has risen due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and increased military 
activities. As a result of this, Finland’s cooperation with NATO, Sweden and other 
Nordic countries has been intensifying. (Government …, 2016: 11-13; Government’s 
…, 2017: 5) Furthermore, Nordic countries and particularly Sweden have “a special 
status in Finland’s bilateral cooperation” based on common values, historical aspects, 
economic integration and other ties. Finland emphasizes wide range of cooperative 
security efforts with Sweden, their common viewpoints to security and intentions to 
deepen Finnish-Swedish foreign policy, security and defence cooperation. Through this, 
Finland aims to strengthen the security of the Baltic Sea region as a whole, defence 
capacities of Finland and Sweden, ability to react to incidents and attacks, and 
capability of joint use of civilian and military resources. The strategic concepts further 
outline Finnish intentions to intensify the Nordic countries’ security cooperation within 
NORDEFCO to strengthen the regional security, e.g. through situational awareness 
cooperation, trainings and exercises, in the field of defence materiel, etc., and increase 
the Nordics’ influence in international questions, but also to collectively intensify 
relations with the US. (Government …, 2016: 21-22; Government’s …, 2017: 17-18) 
Moreover, Finland describes its future visions via defining itself as “a part of the 
European and Nordic communities” (Government …, 2016: 11), therefore emphasising 
the sense of belonging primarily with the Nordic countries in the regional level. The 
2016 concept claims Nordic cooperation to be “ever-strengthening” and of central 
importance to Finland and its security (Government …, 2016: 11-12). In addition to the 
Nordic framework, Finland claims to support the cooperation between NORDEFCO 
and the Baltic States, and specifies that the Baltic countries’ security and prosperity are 
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important to Finland. While Sweden was said to be a partner of special status for 
Finland, Norway, Denmark and Estonia are defined as “important bilateral defence 
cooperation partners”, and Latvia and Lithuania as “close partners”. (Government …, 
2016: 12; Government’s …, 2017: 17-18) 
 Latvia also describes military actions and hybrid threat coming from Russia as 
the reason causing tension and uncertainty in the region, particularly for the Baltic 
countries, and the need to strengthen regional security measures in the Baltic region 
(The National …, 2015: 5; The National …, 2016: 4). While the most effective way to 
Latvia’s security and defence is claimed to be achieved through NATO’s collective 
capacity and presence of the allied forces in the country, Latvia emphasises the need to 
enhance armed forces’ coordination between the Baltic countries, and also with allies 
who are “interested in and are directly involved in strengthening of the security of the 
Baltic Sea Region” (The National …, 2015: 13-14) Close cooperation with the Baltic 
states is also sought in managing the issue of energy security, railroad and road 
infrastructure, logistics, exchange of intelligence information, and enhanced military 
integration. However, regarding many of these aims, Latvia also indicates the need for 
cooperation on the EU level, and particularly with Poland. (The National …, 2015: 21-
23; The National …, 2016: 6-10) Furthermore, Latvia seeks to closely cooperate with 
the Nordic countries in forms of information exchange, value sharing and 
implementation of joint capability projects and activities (The National …, 2016: 9-10). 
Cooperative efforts with both Baltic and Nordic countries are desired in regard to cyber 
threats (The National …, 2015: 28). 
 Lithuania claims its most important defence cooperation partners to be the 
United States, the Baltic and Nordic countries, Poland, and other allies (The Military …, 
2016: 4), with whom Lithuania aims to develop military capabilities together and 
increase interoperability of Lithuanian armed forces and the allies’ forces, within both 
bilateral and multilateral frameworks (The Military …, 2016: 7). The 2017 security 
strategy further sets the aim to strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries and 
strategic partners as well as enhance integration between the Baltic and Nordic regions. 
Details of this objective are described in two parts regarding the region. Firstly, 
Lithuania aims to strengthen cooperation and strategic partnership with the other two 
Baltic states and Poland in several fields, e.g. military, transport, energy security, 
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infrastructure projects, and others. Secondly, the country aims towards bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with the NB8 countries in many fields – including security and 
defence cooperation, possibly in forms such as joint military projects, but also in 
politics, economics, science, culture, energy, transport, environment protection, etc. Key 
intention of Lithuania is a successful representation of common interests at international 
organizations and in other countries through relations of the Nordic and Baltic states 
and a more efficient use of resources. (National …, 2017: 10) Both the Baltic and 
Nordic countries also play a role in Lithuania’s goals in development of export and 
transportation corridors and Lithuanian integration into the EU transport networks 
(National …, 2017: 14), which are conjointly improvements for the security field. 
 Norway starts off with determining itself within the global interest and value 
space – as closest to the Atlantic, European, and Nordic communities. The 2017 concept 
further lists a number of objectives set to achieve stronger European and Nordic 
dimension in Norwegian security, e.g. intensifying the Nordic countries’ security policy 
dialogue and cooperation and developing closer security policy cooperation with other 
European allies. (Setting …, 2017: 5-7) The increased Russian military activity in the 
Baltic Sea and in the High North, according to Norway, “emphasizes the need for close 
security policy dialogue between the Nordic countries, in a Nordic-Baltic framework 
and into NATO and the EU” (Kampkraft …, 2016: 33). Norway presents close Nordic 
and Nordic-Baltic security cooperation as a contribution to Europe’s overall peace and 
security. Therefore, it intends to maintain the close Nordic-Baltic dialogue on 
developments in neighbourhood, and to enhance the efforts within NORDEFCO.  
Notably, Norway also sees the Nordic-Baltic cooperation as a way to promote initiatives 
between NATO and the EU due to the countries’ varying relations with the 
organisations, and hence develop security cooperation between the two. (Setting …, 
2017: 33) Regarding the Nordic-Baltic countries in terms of international organisations, 
Norway supports closer NATO cooperation with Sweden and Finland, and makes 
contributions to the Baltics’ security also through NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence 
(Setting …, 2017: 31-32). Norway further points out that NATO’s efforts are 
increasingly reinforced and complemented by new closer forms of cooperation between 
smaller country groups, and brings its own cooperation with its partners, including the 
Nordic and Baltic countries as an example of this (Setting …, 2017: 11-12). Moreover, 
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Norway emphasises the key importance of the other Nordic countries for Norway, and 
sets aims regarding means of strengthening the Nordics’ cooperative ties. These include 
holding biannual foreign ministers’ meetings, cooperation in civil protection, countering 
violent extremism, promoting integration, and development of “knowledge-based, green 
and digital societies”. (Setting …, 2017: 25-28) With some countries of the region, 
Norway also cooperates within the Arctic Council, and Sweden is a partner of Norway 
in developing verifiable disarmament (Setting …, 2017: 30-34). 
 Sweden has, compared to all other countries, devoted a significantly larger share 
of its security concept to regional cooperation – therefore, the following overview of 
Sweden’s aims and interests will be given more comprehensively. First and foremost, 
Sweden emphasises the importance of cooperation in the Nordic region, but also with 
the Baltic states, as the enhanced cooperation efforts strengthen national defence and the 
ability to carry out operations in the region as well as further away. Inspired by the 
success of collective efforts under NORDEFCO, Sweden aims to even further deepen 
the Nordic cooperation and work towards more efficient use of resources and increased 
military capabilities. Sweden’s most important bilateral partner in the security field is 
Finland, with whom Sweden aims to develop operational planning and preparation for 
the joint use of civilian and military resources in different scenarios, in order to 
contribute to maintaining security in the Baltic Sea area. Further, Denmark and Norway 
are important partners for Sweden. The concept does not list detailed objectives 
regarding these relations, but notes the aim to deepen the cooperation with Denmark 
and develop an even larger exchange with Norway. As its other partners in the region 
Sweden names the Baltics, Germany and Poland, adding that it could possibly develop 
and deepen security cooperation with the latter two, and that it desires to deepen and 
widen cooperation with the Baltics, e.g. in the form of joint exercises. (Försvarspolitisk 
…, 2015: 23-26) Furthermore, Sweden sets an aim of solidarity in security policy – by 
promoting stable relationships in the region through cooperation, but also 
interoperability within NATO, Nordic and Nordic-Baltic frameworks. Discussions have 
been held regarding necessity of establishing joint connected or coordinated resources 
with the Nordic and Baltic countries, e.g. a permanent Nordic battlegroup or a new 
structure for a joint and divisible Nordic-Baltic unit, and joint exercises with other 
countries are determined to be primarily with the Nordic and Baltic states, NATO and 
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the US. (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 56, 70) Together with the other Nordic countries, 
Sweden plans to continue promoting joint Nordic force contributions to the UN 
(Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 35), and the other Nordics are the only actors with whom 
Sweden is ready to exchange its national defence planning (Försvarspolitisk …, 2015: 
64). 
 
 
4.2. Discussion 
 
 As the initial conclusion regarding the question of Nordic-Baltic cooperation, it 
should be noted that all seven countries have devoted a share of their national security 
and defence concepts to regional cooperation with Nordic and Baltic countries. 
Therefore, the interest for such cooperation certainly exists in the area. Below, national 
viewpoints will be discussed and compared in greater detail. 
 To start with, in several cases countries mention the influence of recent 
developments in Russia and its aggressive actions regarding military and hybrid 
security as a threat to the Baltic Sea region. Four of the seven states – Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland and Latvia – express concern over Russia’s threatening actions and 
point it out as a reason for strengthening regional cooperation efforts in the field of 
security and defence. This tendency is a clear indicator of grown will towards 
cooperative security efforts, which draws from the changed security environment in the 
area and between Russia and the West in general. The countries further note the 
increased probability of military threat against one or several states of the region, and 
the challenging nature of this security issue. 
 The Nordic-Baltic cooperation as a separate aim and direction of security 
cooperation appears in concepts of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and 
Sweden, making it a nearly common aim of most of the countries belonging to the area. 
The focus is on enhancement, development and strengthening of the Nordic-Baltic 
security cooperation. Latvian concept indicates cyber security as an intended objective 
of Nordic-Baltic cooperation, Estonia aims to enhance it in political dialogue, defence, 
energy, environment and transport infrastructure, and Lithuania in joint military projects 
as well as in many other fields, and Sweden in joint military efforts and development of 
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interoperability. In some concepts the aim remains rather general and detailed 
objectives in terms of how and in which specific field the enhanced efforts should be 
conducted in are not specified. While some of the indicated potential cooperation fields 
do not overlap, common military efforts in defence seem to be the most common 
intention. The biggest promoter of this aim is Sweden, who mentions the idea of a new 
structure for a joint and divisible Nordic-Baltic unit. The only country that does not 
mention the common Nordic-Baltic dimension in its strategy is Denmark even though it 
notes interests of cooperation with both country groups separately. 
 Secondly, cooperation with the Nordic states is also an aim of all the seven 
countries. This intention is, as could be assumed, stronger within the Nordic countries 
themselves, who also strongly identify with the Nordic community in their 
documentation. All four aim to work towards cooperative Nordic efforts such as 
enhancement of NORDEFCO, more intense security policy dialogue, joint operations, 
trainings, exercises and international contributions, etc. All three Baltic countries also 
indicate interest towards close relations with the Nordics. Estonia sets its cooperation 
interest on objectives regarding energy security, Latvia on information exchange and 
joint capability projects, and Lithuania on transportation infrastructure. An 
extraordinary bind within the Nordic countries is between Finland and Sweden, who 
mutually define each other as a partner of special status in the security field, 
emphasising intentions of deepening the Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation and 
developing joint use of civilian and military resources. Regarding the three Baltic 
countries, the trends are similar by and large. The most important aims set between the 
three states themselves are energy security and infrastructure, but also military 
cooperation. The Nordic countries all claim the Baltics to be close or important partners 
of theirs, but differ in the extent of their cooperation aims. While Finland does not point 
out any specific objectives regarding the Baltics, Denmark commits to cooperation, 
reassurance and defence of the Baltics and even aims to increase research related to the 
Baltic states. Norway, similarly to Denmark, aims to cooperate with the Baltics through 
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, and Sweden indicates the interest to conduct 
joint military exercises with the Baltics. Furthermore, the countries indicate some other 
actors who are considered important regarding the cooperation efforts within the 
Nordic-Baltic area, such as NATO, the US, Poland and the European Union. 
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 The second empirical assumption of the thesis proposed that military 
strengthening and aggressive behaviour of Russia makes the countries of Nordic-Baltic 
area aim towards enhanced cooperative security efforts in the area. For this assumption 
to be proved valid, the implications observed in empirical data would be the countries 
expressing a will and aim of cooperative security efforts in the area for enhancing 
cooperation and moving towards higher amity. This can be claimed to be true in two 
parts. Firstly, all seven countries’ security strategies indicate aims and objectives 
regarding cooperation with the Nordic and the Baltic countries, six of them also in 
regard to Nordic-Baltic multilateral cooperation. Of the more specific aims indicated in 
the national documents, several overlap with other countries’ interests, which also 
makes the goals more collective and achievable. The key collective efforts include joint 
military projects, trainings and exercises, energy and infrastructure security, and general 
enhancement of cooperation. Secondly, while all seven Nordic-Baltic countries indicate 
Russia’s aggressive behaviour and the changed security environment as a threat to the 
region, more than half of the countries directly refer to it as a motivation behind 
enhancement of security cooperation between the states in question. Therefore, the 
assumption proposed is indeed valid in the current case of Nordic-Baltic area, and 
generalising the case within the RSC theory, the countries within the subcomplex are 
enhancing their cooperation and relations of amity within the subcomplex are growing 
due to the countries balancing their cooperation against a common proximate security 
threat. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis has dealt with the Nordic and Baltic countries’ perceptions of shared 
security in the changed security environment after the year 2014. As the aggressive 
international behaviour, threatening statements and military strengthening of Russia 
have increased the security risks in the area, the security perceptions of the Nordic-
Baltic countries and the security relations between them have become subjects of 
influence. The thesis has examined the Nordic-Baltic security environment from two 
perspectives: regarding the countries’ affiliation to NATO’s strategic aims, and 
regarding the regional Nordic-Baltic cooperation. As two central research questions, the 
thesis proposed the following: 1) how do Nordic and Baltic countries relate to NATO’s 
strategic aims and objectives?; and 2) what are Nordic and Baltic countries’ regional 
cooperation interests in the changed security environment? Answers were sought within 
the theoretical framework of regional security complex theory, by conducting 
qualitative content analysis of the Nordic-Baltic countries’ and NATO’s most recent 
security concepts. The findings will be summarised below. 
 The Nordic and Baltic countries’ strategic aims in security and defence have a 
lot in common with NATO’s strategic aims. By and large, majority of the aims of 
NATO are also represented in the Nordic-Baltic countries’ security aims. The extent to 
which the countries’ national aims concur with NATO’s strategic aims does not differ 
significantly by country, neither does it depend on whether the country in question is a 
member state of NATO or merely a partner. What was noted from the analysis is that 
aims related to defence and deterrence appear most important and relevant for the 
countries. Additionally, the Baltic states seem to be more concerned about deterrence 
and nuclear balance than the Nordic countries, but also emphasise energy security and 
openness towards potential candidate states and partners. The Nordic countries direct 
their emphasis more towards crisis management and security threats with global range. 
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These differences can be traced back to different past experiences, historical 
background, and different availability of resources. Secondly, the Baltic and Nordic 
countries’ security cooperation interests were indicated to be high, and this tendency to 
be at least partly connected to the change of security environment in the region and 
intensification of threats from Russia. All seven countries’ security strategies indicate 
aims and objectives regarding cooperation with the Nordic and the Baltic countries, six 
of them also in regard to Nordic-Baltic multilateral cooperation. The key collective 
efforts include joint military projects, trainings and exercises, energy and infrastructure 
security, and general enhancement of cooperation. Four countries directly refer to 
Russia’s behaviour as a motivation behind enhancement of security cooperation 
between the states. Hence, although the countries’ self-perception may rather follow 
identification with either the Nordic or Baltic group, the Nordic-Baltic countries are 
interested in working together towards re-establishing stability in the area. The thesis 
had two empirical assumptions: (h1) that member states of NATO have higher strategic 
intersections with NATO compared to partner states of NATO in the Nordic-Baltic area, 
and (h2) that military strengthening and aggressive behaviour of Russia makes the 
countries of Nordic-Baltic area aim towards enhanced cooperative security efforts in the 
area. Therefore, the first assumption (h1) did not find confirmation as a result of the 
empirical analysis, while the second one was confirmed (h2). 
 The thesis has contributed to filling a gap in literature by looking at how 
NATO’s objectives have been integrated into the member and partner states’ national 
defence policies, and by providing a case study of the Nordic-Baltic area within the 
regional security complex theory. On theoretical level, the thesis has confirmed that 
within a regional (sub)complex, strengthening of a common threat brings countries 
closer together in cooperation based on amity (H2). The other assumption, that states, 
which identify with the global power more closely, are also more eager to relate to it 
strategically (H1) was not supported by the empirical evidence.  Furthermore, the thesis 
has mapped the main security aims of the Nordic-Baltic countries, their cooperation 
interests and strategic relating to NATO on national level, providing better 
understanding of the dynamics of the region’s defence environment and NATO’s role in 
it as well as providing comparative knowledge on the Nordic-Baltic countries’ security 
aims. Future research could, for example, test the theoretical assumptions with a 
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different subcomplex, either within NATO or a different international framework, to 
provide more knowledge on similar tendencies elsewhere and allow to make more 
certain overall conclusions. Alternatively, to further develop the research in regards to 
the Nordic-Baltic area, the aims or groups of aims could be investigated in greater 
detail, comparing and contrasting the national positions also within actual policies 
instead of the strategic level.  
 In conclusion, the Nordic-Baltic countries’ security perceptions include both 
identifying with the greater Euro-Atlantic community as well as with the regional 
cooperative efforts. The countries are well eager to work together towards their 
common aims in security and defence on both levels, even despite not all belonging to a 
unifying security structure. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. List of Strategic Documents Used as Sources of Empirical Data 
(alphabetical, by country) 
 
1. Denmark: Defence Agreement 2018-2023. Adopted 28 January 2018. 
2. Denmark: Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018. Adopted 14 June 
2017. 
3. Estonia: Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused (Basics of Estonian Security Policy). 
Adopted 31 May 2017. 
4. Finland: Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy. Adopted 
19 May 2016. 
5. Finland: Government’s Defence Report. Adopted 16 February 2017. 
6. Latvia: The National Defence Concept. Adopted 16 June 2016. 
7. Latvia: The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (2015 - ). 
Adopted 26 November 2015. 
8. Lithuania: National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania. Adopted 17 
January 2017. 
9. Lithuania: The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania. Adopted 17 
March 2016. 
10. NATO: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Adopted 19-20 November 2010. 
11. Norway: Kampkraft og bærekraft (Capable and Sustainable). Adopted 17 June 
2016. 
12. Norway: Setting the Course for Norwegian Foreign and Security policy. 
Adopted 21 April 2017. 
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13. Sweden: Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020 (Defence 
Policy Orientation – Sweden’s Defence). Adopted 23 April 2015. 
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Appendix 2. Categories in NATO Strategic Concept (2010) 
 
Defence and deterrence 
1. Protection and defence of our territory and our populations against attack 
(Article 5) 
 
2. Deterrence as a core strategic element 
 
3. Strategic nuclear forces as supreme guarantee of security 
 
4. Maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities 
 
5. Maintenance of ability to sustain concurrent operations 
 
6. Development and maintenance of robust, mobile and deployable conventional 
forces 
 
7. Necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange 
to assure defence against full range of conventional and emerging security 
challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for 
allies 
 
8. Allies’ broadest possible participation in collective defence planning on nuclear 
roles 
 
9. Development of capability to defend our populations and territories against 
ballistic missile attack while seeking cooperation with Russia and other Euro-
Atlantic partners 
 
10. Further development of capacity to defend against chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction 
 
11. Further development of ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover 
from cyber attacks 
 
12. Enhancement of capability to detect and defend against international terrorism 
 
13. Development of capacity to contribute to energy security 
 
14. Ensuring being at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging 
technologies and taking potential threats into account in military planning 
 
15. Sustaining the necessary levels of defence spending 
 
16. Deterring and defending against full range of threats 
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Crisis management 
17. Engagement (where possible and necessary) in crisis prevention, management, 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction support beyond NATO’s borders 
 
18. Engagement with other international actors before, during and after crises to 
maximise coherence and effectiveness 
 
19. Monitoring and analysing international environment to anticipate crises and take 
preventive steps if appropriate 
 
20. Preparedness and capability to manage on-going hostilities 
 
21. Preparedness and capability to contribute to post-conflict stabilisation and 
reconstruction 
 
22. Enhancement of intelligence sharing within NATO 
 
23. Further development of doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary 
operations 
 
24. Forming a civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively 
with civilian partners 
 
25. Enhancement of integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis 
spectrum 
 
26. Development of capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones 
 
27. Identifying and training civilian specialists for rapid deployment for selected 
missions 
 
28. Broadening and intensifying political consultations among allies and with 
partners on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis 
 
 
Promoting International Security Through Cooperation 
29. Reinforcement of arms control, promotion of disarmament of both conventional 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction, non-proliferation 
 
30. Creation of conditions for a world without nuclear weapons (in accordance with 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) 
 
31. Further reductions of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe 
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32. Seeking Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in 
Europe and to relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO 
members 
 
33. Stronger conventional arms control regime in Europe 
 
34. Contribution to fight proliferation 
 
35. Maintenance and development of consultations on national decisions regarding 
arms control and disarmament 
 
36. Eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic 
structures 
 
37. Open door to NATO membership to all European democracies which share the 
values of our alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities 
and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common 
security and stability 
 
38. Promotion of security through a wide network of partner relationships with 
countries and organisations around the globe 
 
39. Dialogue and cooperation with partners, based on reciprocity, mutual benefit 
and mutual respect 
 
40. Enhancement of partnerships through flexible formats 
 
41. Preparedness to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any 
nations and relevant organisations that share our interest in peaceful 
international relations 
 
42. Being open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of 
common concern 
 
43. Giving operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on 
NATO-led missions to which they contribute 
 
44. Further development of existing partnerships 
 
45. Deeper political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN 
 
46. Stronger strategic partnership, deeper political dialogue and practical 
cooperation with the EU, cooperating more fully in capability development to 
minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness 
 
47. Strategic partnership with Russia 
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48. Enhancement of political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia 
(through NATO-Russia Council) 
 
49. Development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the 
Mediterranean, deeper cooperation in the Mediterranean Dialogue and openness 
to inclusion of other countries of the region 
 
50. Deeper security partnership with Gulf partners, stronger cooperation in the 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and readiness to welcome new partners 
 
51. Enhancement of consultations and practical military cooperation with partners in 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
 
52. Continuation and development of partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia 
(NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia commissions) 
 
53. Facilitation of Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans 
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